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  INTRODUCTION   
A dominant theme in the legal and political literature is 
that the legislative function and its attendant rent-seeking 
threaten property rights and promote their coercive redistribu-
tion.1 Yet, as some scholars have recognized, in certain circum-
stances politics may promote private property protection.2
 
 1. See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New 
York Court of Appeals, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 355 (1990) (describing 
how courts distrusted political solutions to regulating land use competition); 
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
907, 916 (1993) (discussing harms to democracy from resource entitlement de-
stabilization by the political process). This argument is central to the volumi-
nous literature examining the impact of rent-seeking special interests groups, 
as well as to Richard Epstein’s work on takings. See generally RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
199–209 (1985) (voicing concerns about rent-seeking factions gaining the 
property of others); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation 
Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1586–90 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra) 
(describing the centrality of the rent-seeking concern to Epstein’s theory of 
takings). For literature on the dynamics of legislative rent-seeking, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–67 (1971) (discussing 
theoretical underpinnings of special interest groups); Bruce A. Ackerman, Be-
yond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–31 (1985) (describing the 
power of “discrete and insular minorities” to capture the legislative process). 
 I 
view this debate through the lens of judicial takings, a doctrine 
espoused in a plurality opinion in the 2010 Supreme Court 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOM-
ICS, AND POLITICS 339–40 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and 
Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137–38 (1992); cf. JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 155 (1992) (arguing that 
property rights should not be left entirely to political process).  
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case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection.3 The discourse on judicial 
takings has focused on the constitutionality and comparative 
institutional competence of federal courts versus state courts to 
address judicial property activism.4
In Stop the Beach, the Supreme Court addressed whether a 
Florida Supreme Court decision to uphold Florida’s Beach 
Shore Preservation Act effected an unconstitutional taking of 
private property rights.
 This Article brings a ne-
glected player to the fore—state legislatures. I advance a state 
legislative process theory, grounded by takings federalism, that 
calls into question the need for judicial takings and reveals un-
derappreciated benefits of the status quo. State legislative 
checks of court activism suggest one explanation for why judi-
cial takings protection has not developed in either the federal 
or state systems—and an argument against adopting a federal 
judicial takings doctrine now.  
5 After sanding a seventy-five-foot wide 
strip to create new shorefront, the state replaced the mean high 
water line with a “fixed erosion control line,” which meant that 
that the state owned the restored portion of the beach and any 
future accretions (i.e., gradual additions of sand to the beach).6 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that there had been no taking 
because under Martin v. Busch, an obscure Florida precedent 
brought to light in the U.S. Solicitor General’s amicus brief,7
 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 
 4. See id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring) (voicing concern about federal 
judges playing “a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state in-
terest—state property law”). For academic scholarship on this point, see D. 
Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 
903, 932–36 (2011) (analyzing tensions of federal court review of state court 
decisions); Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collat-
eral Attack on State Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 
116–18 (2011) (discussing judicial federalism concerns); Amnon Lehavi, Judi-
cial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 561 (2012) (examin-
ing principles that limit federal review of state court decisions); Timothy M. 
Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 
251–59 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/946.pdf (discussing the 
relationship between judicial takings and due process). 
 5. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (citing Walton Cnty. v. Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1116–21 (Fla. 2008)). 
 6. Id. at 2599 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 161.161(3)–(5), 161.191(1)–(2) (2010)). 
The state assumed ongoing obligations to maintain the restored beach and did 
not claim any rights of public use. Id. 
 7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 26, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3183079 at *26 
(citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 284–85 (Fla. 1927)). 
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man-made avulsions that expose previously submerged land 
seaward of the littoral property belong to the state.8
The constitutional innovation in Stop the Beach came when 
a plurality of four of the eight sitting Justices announced that 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should apply to the judi-
ciary—a doctrine without precedent beyond passing reference 
in a few cases and discussion in two law review articles.
  
9 Re-
jecting due process protection as insufficient, the plurality 
maintained that if “a court declares that what was once an es-
tablished right of private property no longer exists, it has taken 
that property.”10 State court decisions that “merely clarify and 
elaborate property entitlements” are not judicial takings.11 Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the plurality, offered a textualist justifi-
cation: the Takings Clause “is not addressed to the action of a 
specific branch or branches . . . the particular state actor is ir-
relevant.”12 The plurality further concluded that state courts 
cannot redress state supreme court takings and that these cas-
es must be heard by the ostensibly less compromised federal 
courts.13
Judicial takings doctrine, at least in the expansive form 
proposed by the plurality, is a costly innovation.
 
14
 
 8. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2596. “Avulsion” refers to the sudden 
loss or addition of land by the force or action of water. See id. at 2598. But see 
Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Be-
tween Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 37, 65 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court misinterpreted 
Martin v. Busch).  
 Scholars 
have described the potential harms from judicial takings, prin-
 9. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. For early scholarly discussions 
of judicial takings, see Williamson B.C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi: Can Courts “Take” Property?, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 78 (1979); Bar-
ton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1472–1512 
(1990).  
 10. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. In the plurality opinion, Scalia re-
jected the notion of “using Substantive Due Process to do the work of the Tak-
ings Clause,” arguing that to do so would require reliance on a “more general-
ized notion of Substantive Due Process” despite “an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection.” See id. at 2606 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)).  
 11. Id. at 2609. 
 12. Id. at 2601–02. 
 13. See id. at 2609. 
 14. Of course, costliness depends on the breadth and construction of judi-
cial takings doctrine. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 57, 90 (2012) (noting that applying certain limiting principles 
would make judicial takings “something rarely encountered in the wild”). 
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cipally the chilling of common law development and infringe-
ment on state autonomy.15 A spate of scholarship also details 
how judicial takings will waste judicial resources, hamstring 
environmental protection and responses to climate change, cre-
ate perverse litigation incentives, and threaten the internal 
consistency of federal takings jurisprudence.16 Even a narrowly 
crafted judicial takings doctrine has the potential to increase 
litigation and court costs and, in some cases, frustrate public 
efforts to protect property.17
The narrative that accompanies judicial takings is that 
state courts are prone, or at least vulnerable, to overreaching 
and “taking” private property rights and when this occurs there 
is no effective check.
 In view of these costs, it is worth 
examining existing institutional mechanisms more closely in 
considering whether to adopt judicial takings, and if so, how 
broadly to define this doctrine.  
18 State legislative protection is a counter-
narrative that has been ignored in the judicial takings debate, 
which has focused on the propensity of state courts to overreach 
and the capacity of federal courts to address these abuses. In 
the unusual instances when radical state court decisions elimi-
nate clearly established property rights, state legislatures often 
respond with legislation that restores most or all of the original 
private property entitlement.19
 
 15. See Dogan & Young, supra note 
 State legislative checks not only 
revise state court judgments ex post, they also influence courts 
4, at 115–16 (discussing costs to com-
mon law development and federalism); Mulvaney, supra note 4, at 266 (“[T]he 
new judicial takings construct may very well threaten the ability of the law to 
adapt and evolve in the face of changing economic, environmental, social, and 
technological developments.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 71–72 (2009) (discussing the consequences of judi-
cial takings doctrine on legal responses to climate change); Michael B. Kent, 
Jr., More Questions than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing 
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 156–66 (2011) (examin-
ing the unresolved questions about the relationship between judicial takings 
and regulatory takings as prescribed by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 
U.S. 528 (2005)); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial 
Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 335–54 (2011) (describing 
the perverse incentive created by a judicial takings for underinvesting in liti-
gation to clarify common law property rights).  
 17. But see Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 553, 557 (2012) (contending that in some circumstances judicial 
takings can provide beneficial transition relief for property law changes).  
 18. See, e.g., Thompson Jr., supra note 9, at 1495–98. 
 19. For case studies of legislative checks in Hawaii, Minnesota, Utah, and 
California, see infra Part II. 
  
2013] JUDICIAL TAKINGS 2181 
 
ex ante toward property stability. Legislative revisions offer 
other advantages: state legislatures can adopt middle ground 
solutions, pay off losers, frame revisions to build consensus and 
increase political palatability, and, through their role as state 
constitutional backstops, perhaps even fortify legislators’ con-
stitutional commitments.20
A recent example of a state legislative check of judicial 
property activism is the case Conatser v. Johnson, in which the 
Utah Supreme Court abruptly eliminated riparian owners’ riv-
erbed property rights.
  
21 Breaking with longstanding precedent 
and state understanding of public water rights, the Utah Su-
preme Court held that the public had the right to stand on riv-
erbeds, opening up a massive fishing industry within feet of 
private homes and retreats.22 The legislature responded swiftly 
with the Public Waters Access Act that restored the property 
rights to the private riverbed owners, the original entitlement 
holders.23 The legislature also offered a degree of implicit com-
pensation to the losing recreational users by granting rights of 
portage and adverse possession and by prohibiting the practice 
of stringing wire across rivers to block recreational users.24
In a legislative process model, state court restraint works 
in a balanced tandem with legislative revision. Legislative 
checks are too resource intensive and variable to serve as a 
first-line response. State courts have evolved doctrinal substi-
tutes for judicial takings, such as state common law doctrines 
of vested rights, that orient courts toward property rights sta-
bility and conservatism.
 
25
 
 20. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 57–58 (1999) (arguing that the federal courts’ robust constitutional 
role reduces attention to constitutional concerns by Congress).  
 Political pressures on elected state 
court judges also mitigate judicial activism. We need not char-
 21. See 194 P.3d 897, 902 (Utah 2008). 
 22. See id. (“[E]very private landowner to whom the [public water owner-
ship] easement applies [is] subject to the reasonable burdens imposed by the 
easement. These burdens include the public’s right to both travel over private 
property when floating and to touch the water’s bed while floating.”). 
 23. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-201(3), -202(3) (West 2012).  
 24. Id.§ 73-29-202(2) (granting the right to “portage around a dangerous 
obstruction”); id. § 73-29-203(1)(a) (“Public recreational access is established if: 
the private property has been used by the public for recreational access requir-
ing the use of the public water for a period of at least 10 consecutive years 
. . . .”); id. § 73-29-207 (allowing a land owner to place a fence across public wa-
ter, but requiring the fence to be in compliance with other state and local 
laws). 
 25. See infra Part I.A. 
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acterize state court judges as rent-seeking political actors or 
anti-majoritarian angels to recognize that they operate within 
political networks characterized by a non-trivial degree of pres-
sure from campaign financing (primarily by business and con-
servative interests) and electoral scrutiny.26 If these political 
influences affect state court decisions, they cut more often than 
not in the direction of private property protection, at least with 
respect to in-state owners and rights.27
No system, whether state legislative checks or a newly 
minted judicial takings doctrine, is fail-safe (e.g., judicial tak-
ings require costly appeals that some would-be claimants can-
not afford to pursue). Majoritarian support or strong interest 
group support for a “judicial taking” can block legislative 
checks. State legislatures may have little motivation to check 
state supreme court decisions that validate favored enact-
ments. When legislative revision does occur, it is not invariably 
efficient or fair. Certainly, there are examples of dysfunctional 
legislation in the histories of state and local land use regula-
tion.
  
28 Accordingly, the robust role of state courts as a first-line 
defense is important, as is the vigorous politics that attend the 
high-stakes natural resource and land use contexts of most al-
leged judicial takings.29
 
 26. This is a political iteration of social networks theory. See Mark 
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 203–07 (1983). 
  
 27. In some instances, lower court judges may have political motives to 
favor local interests in their property rights adjudications; however, the panel 
or en banc structure of state supreme court review addresses this sort of local 
bias. For an example of a controversial state court treatment of out-of-state 
property interests, see In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 
1999), superseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 
(Idaho 2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion); John D. Echeverria, 
Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in 
State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 238–54 (2001). 
 28. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 
625 (1981) (describing how a municipal legislature rezoned the landowner’s 
property to open-space intending to acquire the property and retained the zon-
ing without compensation after the voters failed to approve funding for the 
park).  
 29. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. 
COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992) (noting that victims of takings have the organiza-
tional advantages of forming a small group with high stakes, sharing a geo-
graphic connection, and appealing to political parties or groups); Stewart E. 
Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 
YALE L.J. 203, 235 (2004) (distinguishing takings questions from “free speech 
or equal protection controversies that typically pit a disenfranchised individu-
al with an unpopular cause against the power of the state”).  
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My account of state legislative process protection for judi-
cial takings hews to takings federalism and the rationales un-
derlying the Supreme Court’s longstanding delegation of much 
of regulatory takings doctrine to state courts.30 Stewart Sterk 
describes how the Supreme Court has implicitly delegated pow-
er to the states by adopting a balancing test that establishes a 
high threshold for unconstitutional regulatory takings, relies 
on state law to define the “reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations” component of that test, and almost invariably up-
holds state court determinations.31 As Sterk explains, this is 
not a matter of muddled takings jurisprudence but of federal-
ism.32 Regulatory takings claims involve state- or local-level 
law and conflicts that federal courts lack the expertise, re-
sources, and desire to resolve.33 As a result, the Supreme Court 
has de facto devolved primary responsibility for regulatory tak-
ings doctrine to the states.34
 
 30. See Sterk, supra note 
 In the context of judicial takings, 
takings federalism undermines the case for expanding the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause to encompass courts. Making the 
offending state supreme court a primary author of the judicial 
takings doctrine and substantive property law that will pur-
29, at 206–07, 254. 
 31. See id. at 251 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. See id. at 270–71. 
 33. See id. at 233 (“A statute or regulation enacted in one jurisdiction 
might pass constitutional muster even though an identical statute in another 
jurisdiction has proven constitutionally infirm—all because of a difference in 
background state law.”).  
 34. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause 
and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 498 (2000) (arguing that 
“the Court should give state and local governments a fairly wide berth when 
determining whether a landowner should be compensated for the developmen-
tal effect of land use regulations”); Marc R. Poirier, Federalism and Localism 
in Kelo and San Remo, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 101, 117 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (noting that the 
Supreme Court “in effect defer[s] to state court policing of state and local gov-
ernment implementation of the eminent domain power, whether via the feder-
al public use clause or for other reasons and doctrines”); Carol M. Rose, What 
Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 
1684 (2007) (“[T]hough the federal courts are now much more active in takings 
cases than they once were, their decisions continue to leave the vast bulk of 
property and land use supervision to the state courts.” (citing Sterk, supra 
note 29, at 238–44)); Sterk, supra note 29, at 206 (“The Supreme Court’s . . . 
balancing test, which, as a matter of practice, results in deference to the state 
courts, recognizes the institutional advantages state courts enjoy in constrain-
ing regulatory abuse.” (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 129 (1978))).  
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portedly constrain it leaves the alleged judicial fox guarding the 
henhouse. Conversely, rigorous federal scrutiny and a robust 
judicial takings doctrine developed by federal courts not only 
chill state common law development but cast the Supreme 
Court back into the state law waters it has so studiously sought 
to exit.  
The central thesis of this Article is that in view of takings 
federalism and the costs of judicial takings, the existing bal-
ance of state legislative checks and state court restraint works 
well enough to police against state court activism with respect 
to property rights. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I de-
scribes the mechanisms of restraint that orient state court 
judges toward property rights stability. The limited number of 
state legislative checks of judicial “takings” are due in substan-
tial measure to doctrines and norms of judicial restraint that 
make radical judicial confiscation, and the need for legislative 
revision, an unusual occurrence. Part II, the heart of the Arti-
cle, advances a legislative process theory of judicial takings 
grounded in case studies of state legislative checks. I explore 
the comparative institutional advantages of situating judicial 
revision primarily in state legislatures. Part III considers the 
potential unintended consequences of the judicial takings doc-
trine elaborated in Stop the Beach for state legislative process. 
Part IV discusses the implications of my analysis, with particu-
lar attention to takings federalism, and addresses possible ob-
jections to my account. Throughout the Article, I assume that 
judicial takings doctrine is likely to follow the contours of regu-
latory takings doctrine, at least loosely, by requiring a substan-
tial degree of property rights interference and by affording less 
protection to use rights. I leave as open questions the degree of 
judicial takings protection afforded to owners (i.e., the thresh-
old for success) and whether temporary takings damages will 
apply under First English.35
I.  BASELINES OF RESTRAINT: DOCTRINAL AND 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM  
 
Because of the high costs of legislative lawmaking, a legis-
lative process approach to judicial takings requires that the 
state courts not tax legislatures too heavily with activism. As 
Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner have observed, legislation is 
 
 35. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
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“an extremely expensive form of [law] production.”36 This Part 
considers how doctrinal, institutional, and political forces con-
strain courts and limit property rights radicalism. The Stop the 
Beach plurality’s expansive judicial takings doctrine, which 
would apply to any judicial interpretation that eliminates a 
common law property right and possibly encompass private 
party cases, implies that state court overreaching is a problem 
of magnitude and breadth.37 Some of the scholarly response, 
even that opposed to judicial takings doctrine, has accepted to a 
significant degree the narrative of state court property rights 
abuses—a major critique is not that state court judges are more 
constrained than assumed, but that federal court judges may 
be similarly activist.38 Yet, neither the Supreme Court nor 
commentators advocating judicial takings have offered more 
than a handful of examples of state court property “takings,” 
much less systemic evidence of property rights overreaching, by 
state courts.39
 
 36. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267 (1974). 
  
 37. See Mulvaney, supra note 4, at 260–01 (noting inconsistent language 
in the Save the Beach plurality opinion that “raises the question of whether 
the plurality’s standard applies where a state court, in adjudicating an exclu-
sively private dispute, clarifies a property rule in a manner that effectively re-
sults in a private-to-private reassignment”). 
 38. See William P. Marshall, Keynote Address, Judicial Takings, Judicial 
Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of the Model of the Judge as Political Actor, 
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 26 (2011) (“The premise that judicial de-
cisions inevitably reflect political bias does not allow for exception and does 
not exclude Justices sitting on the United States Supreme Court.”); Peñalver 
& Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29 (describing risks for judicial wrongdo-
ing). But see Lehavi, supra note 4, at 579–80 (arguing that judicial interpreta-
tions of broad legislative standards or legal issues left unaddressed in state 
statutes are an exercise of legislatively delegated authority, not a judicial tak-
ing). 
 39. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem 
of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 92–100 (2011) (ar-
guing that the “principle [of judicial takings] follows logically from both the 
text and the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment”). Discrete examples of 
state court property activism include County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 
57, 57–58 (Haw. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 132 (1974) (holding that land-
owners were not entitled to compensation for land below the seaward bounda-
ry line of an ocean front lot condemned by the state for public use) (reversed 
on appeal to federal district court), and McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, 
504 P.2d 1330, 1345 (Haw. 1973), adhered to on reh’g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973) 
(holding that “owners of land, having either or both riparian or appurtenant 
water rights, have the right to the use of the water, but no property in the wa-
ter itself”). 
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What is the basis of the apparent belief of much of the Su-
preme Court and many legal commentators that state courts 
have a proclivity toward abusing or unsettling private property 
rights? In recent opinions, the Supreme Court has subscribed 
to a political view of state court judges. In Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, the Court invalidated, on First Amend-
ment grounds, a Minnesota judicial canon forbidding candi-
dates for judicial office from announcing their views on disput-
ed legal or political issues.40 The Court framed state court 
judges as political actors bound only by the requirement that 
they not act on personal bias against a particular litigant. In 
the absence of such bias, it is permissible, and indeed expected, 
that when a judge takes a stand during an election about an is-
sue, subsequently “the party taking the opposite stand [in a 
case before that judge] is likely to lose. . . . not because of any 
bias against that party . . . [but because] [t]he judge is applying 
the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly.”41 Once the Court 
acknowledged the political nature of judging, it was a short 
step to envisioning its threat to private property rights. In Stop 
the Beach, a plurality of the Court took that step.42 They pre-
sented state courts as a comparably dangerous branch to legis-
latures with respect to property rights and announced that 
both bodies require the disciplining hand of the Takings 
Clause.43
A. DOCTRINAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE COURT 
PROPERTY ACTIVISM 
  
Perceptions and intuitions about judicial property rights 
abuses derive disproportionately from canonical cases that fol-
lowed the atypical path to Supreme Court review or are fea-
tured in law school curriculums and scholarly articles for their 
controversial positions or dramatic redistributions.44
 
 40. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 Hawaii, 
 41. Id. at 776–77. 
 42. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S.Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). 
 43. Their opinion subsumed both courts and legislatures in the political 
category of state actors, declaring that “[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to 
do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative 
fiat.” Id. at 2601. 
 44. For example, famous takings cases heighten perceptions of the fre-
quency of shoreline management plans depriving owners of all of their devel-
opment rights, state courts redistributing property from employers to employ-
ee-tenants, localities abusing eminent domain for economic redevelopment to 
 
  
2013] JUDICIAL TAKINGS 2187 
 
with its unique and bitter history of land appropriation, conflict 
over native rights, and a century of attempted secession, also 
contorts the landscape of property law with cases such as Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, County of Hawaii v. 
Sotomura, and McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, that re-
distribute private property to the state or even to other private 
parties.45 It is no surprise that Hawaii cases feature dispropor-
tionately in accounts depicting the problem of judicial takings.46
But is this “property canon” the everyday stuff of state 
courts?
  
47 Cases where state courts apply precedent to uphold 
established common law property rights or overturn lower 
court property rights abuses are less thrilling to the imagina-
tion as well as less accessible (such cases lack written opinions 
more often than those overturning established rights).48
 
serve private interests, and courts transferring valuable water use rights from 
private parties to the public. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1008 (1992); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–36 (1984); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954). 
 Selec-
 45. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 (upholding as constitutional the transfer 
of land via eminent domain from plantation owner oligopoly to private citi-
zens); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 62–63 (Haw. 1973) (holding 
no compensation owned for eminent domain for land seaward of the upper 
reaches of the wash of the waves because the court rejected the longstanding 
prior common law seaward boundary); McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, 
504 P.2d 1330, 1344 (Haw. 1973) (breaking with common law to hold that the 
normal surplus water was the property of the state and that riparian owners 
could not transfer that water outside the watershed). For accounts of the his-
torical forces underlying Hawaiian property conflicts and the history of the 
Hawaiian sovereignty movement, see MICHAEL KIONI DUDLEY & KEONI 
KEALOHA AGARD, A CALL FOR HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 107–29 (1993), and 
JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI’I? 1–10 (2008). 
 46. See, e.g., Robert H. Thomas et al., Of Woodchucks and Prune Yards: A 
View of Judicial Takings from the Trenches, 35 VT. L. REV. 437, 442–50 (2010) 
(describing a number of takings cases from Hawaii); see also Barros, supra 
note 4, at 941 (citing two Hawaii cases as “good examples” of takings jurispru-
dence).  
 47. We need not believe these cases are strictly representative for ongoing 
exposure and engagement with them to affect our perceptions. See Lee Epstein 
& Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11–14, 52–53 (2002) 
(critiquing the empirical and logical shortcomings of legal scholarship); see al-
so Ahmed E. Taha, Data and Selection Bias: A Case Study, 75 UMKC L. REV. 
171, 174–77 (2006) (exploring how selection bias affects conclusions). 
 48. See Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publi-
cation Practices, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991) (noting that several jurisdic-
tions only publish opinions that “establish a new rule of law; that alter, modi-
fy, explain, or criticize an existing rule; that involve an issue of continuing 
public interest; that resolve conflicts; or that apply an existing rule to a new 
fact situation”). 
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tion bias, in the form of constitutional and scholarly focus on a 
small collection of exceptional cases, means that 
nonrepresentative cases have disproportionate influence in le-
gal thought and policy.49
The focus on exceptional cases belies the high baseline of 
state judicial restraint and property rights stability. Certainly, 
courts alter common law doctrines in light of changed circum-
stances and create exceptions to avoid forfeiture or other per-
ceived unfairness.
  
50 Yet, the target of the Stop the Beach plural-
ity—the wholesale elimination of established common law 
property rights—appears to be an unusual occurrence.51 Even 
among the small group of cases commonly understood as activ-
ist, most are less radical, or produce more ephemeral changes, 
than commonly assumed. For example, water and shoreline 
common law is interwoven with precedents recognizing public 
and private interests, often in a checkered or waxing and wan-
ing lineage.52 Sometimes what appears to be a sudden change 
in the law or a property redistribution actually reflects the ju-
diciary strengthening or reviving longstanding threads of pub-
lic common law water rights.53 When state court holdings are 
truly radical, they are often narrowed over time as subsequent 
cases carve out exceptions and limit the precedent.54
 
 49. Scientists and methodologists have long recognized the issue of selec-
tion bias and inferential error. See ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERROR AND 
SURVEY COSTS 28–30 (1989).  
 For exam-
 50. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577, 597–601 (1988). 
 51. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2616 (2010). 
 52. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great 
Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4–10 (2010). 
 53. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or 
Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 882–83, 892–95 (2000) (contending that the 
common law of prior appropriation in water rights is mostly rhetoric and that 
it truly functions as an extreme default rule that induces cooperation and bar-
gaining). 
 54. For example, in State v. Shack, the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
parted from the traditional common law property right of owners to exclude by 
holding that trespass as defined in the New Jersey statute does not include 
the right to bar access to governmental services to migrant workers housed on 
private property. 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). The New Jersey courts cab-
ined this holding in subsequent cases. State v. Schmid adopted a multi-part 
test that restricted trespass depending on the nexus between the nature of the 
property and expressional activity. 423 A.2d 615, 621–22 (N.J. 1980). Then 
Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n held 
that common interest communities were private property not subject to consti-
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ple, the activist nature of State v. Shack and its sharp depar-
ture from precedent are renowned, but not the decision’s ero-
sion in a line of subsequent New Jersey cases.55
In other cases, radical holdings seem less radical with a 
closer view of the circumstances. For example, Marc Poirier’s 
historical study of Matthews v. Bayhead
  
56 and similar New Jer-
sey beach access cases reveals that rather than a bald transfer 
of property rights, these cases were responses by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the 
state government to de facto discrimination barring minorities 
from beaches.57 In the famous case of State ex rel. Thornton v. 
Hay, the Oregon Supreme Court denied a legislative takings 
challenge by introducing a common law doctrine of custom that 
secured public use rights in beach areas.58 Justice Scalia harsh-
ly criticized this case in his objection to the Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, a subsequent 
case upholding Thornton.59 Scalia opined that a state court 
cannot evade takings liability by declaring custom to be a back-
ground principle of state law.60 An underappreciated fact of the 
Thornton case, however, is that the public had already acquired 
those use rights through the more commonplace doctrine of 
prescription (a variant of adverse possession applicable to 
easements).61
 
tutional limitations on state actors with respect to expressional activities and 
assembly. 929 A.2d 1060, 1072–74 (N.J. 2007). 
 Basing the decision on prescription would have 
 55. See supra note 54. 
 56. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
 57. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Move-
ments of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civ-
il Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 732–42, 772–75, 808–11 (1996). Although the 
litigants in many of the beach access cases focused their claims on statutory 
and public trust arguments rather than equal protection, racial discrimination 
remained in the backdrop of the cases. See id. at 762–65, 772–75. Another fact 
worth noting is that although the precedents in New Jersey are quite remark-
able, lack of parking and public access points and creative beach fees techni-
cally within the letter of Neptune reduce the impact of these holdings. Public 
Trust Doctrine and Public Access in New Jersey, URBAN HARBORS INST., UNIV. 
OF MASS. BOS. 8–9 (Jan. 2003), http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/public_ 
access_in_nj.pdf. 
 58. 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (holding that the state’s refusal to allow a 
beachfront owner to install fencing was not a taking). 
 59. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 passim (1994) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 60. See id. at 1214. 
 61. 462 P.2d at 676 (holding that the public could have acquired the dis-
puted land based on prescription rights). 
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led to years of fact-intensive parcel-by-parcel litigation whereas 
custom accomplished the same legal purpose, more bluntly 
perhaps, but with far less judicial and litigation expense.62
Doctrinal and institutional, as well as political, forces ori-
ent state courts toward property rights stability so that legisla-
tive checks are rarely necessary.
  
63 As an ex ante matter, the 
“age of statutes” and codification limit the influence of the 
common law and judicial lawmaking—indeed, some scholars 
have argued that it strains the judicial function altogether.64 
Doctrinally, a number of common law doctrines function as ju-
dicial takings substitutes by preventing and invalidating judi-
cial property redistributions (though not by providing compen-
sation).65 Canons of common law judging such as stare decisis, 
the principle that absent important countervailing considera-
tions like cases should be decided alike, promote property 
rights stability.66
 
 62. See Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida Beach 
Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 713, 743 (2011). 
 State due process, wrongly painted with the 
 63. Property theorists advocate stability of entitlement with a variety of 
rationales, including encouraging investment, facilitating transfer by minimiz-
ing information costs, strengthening relationships to property and community, 
and protecting democracy. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 40–41 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the need for stable property rights to 
encourage investment); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 
YALE L.J. 1, 63–64 (2000) (offering an information-minimization theory of 
property forms); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1889, 1894 (2005) (offering a relational theory of property); Sunstein, supra 
note 1, at 916 (arguing that property rights that are vulnerable to destabiliza-
tion by the political process weaken democracy).  
 64. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1, 
5–6 (1982). Responding to “statutorification,” Guido Calabresi has argued that 
common law courts should judge whether a legal rule is anachronistic or inap-
posite to the legal framework, and either renovate the rule or induce legisla-
tive reconsideration. Id. at 163–66. 
 65. In a 1992 article, Daniel A. Farber argued that judicial decisions 
should rarely be considered takings because “formalized procedures” make the 
risk of discrimination against a particular party or non-state actors compara-
tively low. See Farber, supra note 29, at 307. 
 66. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2012) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is de-
signed to promote stability in the law, but is a principle of policy, rather than 
a rule requiring mechanical adherence.”); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2012). 
From Edward Coke to the present, the core conception of common law judging 
is of reliance on precedent rather than unpredictable changes or sua sponte 
reinterpretation. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law 
Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 55, 588 (2006) (advancing a theory of common 
law originalism at the time of the founding that balanced continuity with flex-
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same brush as federal due process as inefficacious—a constitu-
tional wimp—by the Stop the Beach plurality and some schol-
ars, has been a major impetus in the development of common 
law property doctrines safeguarding private entitlements.67 
Vested rights doctrines, emanating from state due process, pro-
tect private property rights once an owner establishes that her 
expectations were reasonable and backed by financial invest-
ment.68 These doctrines include “grandfathering” non-
conforming uses despite later zoning changes69 and protecting 
owners who make substantial good-faith investments from sub-
sequent change in land use regulations that would prevent de-
velopment.70
 
ibility by treating common law as “supplying the terms of a debate” about con-
stitutional questions). Some state courts and practice guides counsel a strong 
form of stare decisis and require “urgent reasons for departures” while others 
frame it as a “principle of policy” and clarify exceptions for precedents that are 
“unworkable or badly reasoned.” Compare Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 
704 (Ind. 1986) (“[A] rule which has been deliberately declared should not be 
disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation 
of error.”), with 1 MICHIGAN PLEADING & PRACTICE § 2:81 (2d ed. 2012) (“Stare 
decisis is a principle of policy rather than an inexorable command.”).  
 Waiver protects a claimant’s reasonable and suffi-
ciently crystallized expectations based on prior non-
enforcement of covenants and rules by homeowners associa-
 67. See, e.g., Friarsgate, Inc. v. Town of Irmo, 349 S.E.2d 891, 894 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a developer had a vested property right that pre-
vented the town from applying a new zoning ordinance to his condominium 
construction project); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 
559, 564–65 (Utah 1967) (striking a zoning ordinance as an unconstitutional 
taking as applied to plaintiff’s parcel, which had vested rights). 
 68. See Richard B. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Es-
toppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 641 (1978). 
The common law protections for vested rights apply unless owners act in bad 
faith, expand the use beyond their original vested right, abandon the property, 
or signal both attenuated expectations and limited harm (e.g., through lack of 
financial investment or steps toward construction). See Grayson P. Hanes & J. 
Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 373, 407–08 (1989) (describing variation and exceptions in vest-
ed rights doctrines). 
 69. See Town of Surry v. Starkey, 332 A.2d 172, 175 (N.H. 1975); Gibbons 
& Reed Co., 431 P.2d at 563 (“[A] zoning ordinance which required the discon-
tinuance forthwith of a nonconforming use would be a deprivation of property 
without due process of law.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Henry & Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 424 A.2d 1132, 
1133–34 (N.H. 1980) (“[T]he common-law rule is that ‘an owner, who, relying 
in good faith on the absence of any regulation which would prohibit his pro-
posed project, has made substantial construction on the property or has in-
curred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto, or both, acquires a vest-
ed right to complete his project . . . .’” (quoting Gosselin v. Nashua, 321 A.2d 
593, 596 (N.H. 1974))). 
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tions.71 Similarly, laches prohibits the enforcement of an equi-
table servitude when the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed 
and in doing so altered the expectations of the defendant to her 
prejudice.72
There is also little support for the claim that state courts 
will wrongfully favor or “collude” with legislatures in order to 
uphold state enactments—and if this does occur it can be re-
dressed as a standard Fifth Amendment legislative taking.
  
73 
Judicial favoritism toward legislatures or legislative enact-
ments is not a straightforward matter: many enactments pass 
through divided legislatures and in some cases the political 
winds may have shifted and legislators no longer back the en-
actment. The legislature may be sympathetic to a takings claim 
against an agency-promulgated regulation they had not envi-
sioned and do not favor. Also, many cases of court activism, or 
seeming court activism, focus on pure common law issues (often 
water rights) or interpret the common law in a way that either 
upholds or does not address a state legislative enactment.74 In 
Stop the Beach, a case involving a state enactment and poten-
tial takings compensation, the Florida trial and appellate 
courts divided and the litigants failed to present a key prece-
dent on avulsion.75 Poor legal research, not favoritism toward 
the legislature, informed the Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
sion.76
To be clear, my claim is not that state courts never err or 
overreach or that they resist incremental adjustments of prop-
 
 
 71. See, e.g., Woodlands Civic Ass’n v. Darrow, 765 So. 2d 874, 876–77 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a restrictive covenant forbidding busi-
nesses in residential subdivision did not apply to owner’s chiropractic business 
when the immediate prior owner had run a business there for many years and 
made commercial changes to the exterior of the building without homeowner 
association enforcement). 
 72. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY: MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF DESK EDI-
TION § 60.10[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009). In addition, the emergence of 
“investment-backed expectations” as a major prong of regulatory takings anal-
ysis accords constitutional force to stability of expectations. See Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 73. I thank Stewart Sterk for this insight. For an account of the problem 
of courts colluding with legislatures to uphold legislative enactments, see 
Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29. 
 74. See supra notes 52–55. 
 75. For an overview of the procedural history, see Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2600–01 (2010). 
 76. See id. 
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erty rights. Carol Rose describes how courts “muddy” crystal-
line property rules over time with exceptions and rule variants 
that address changed circumstances, protect a guileless or 
bumbling party, protect property, or avoid forfeiture.77 Some 
property law doctrines, such as adverse possession, allow 
changes to property rights, although state courts typically ap-
ply the legal standards stringently so prevailing on these 
claims is difficult.78 Other cases, such as nuisance, address con-
flicting or unallocated property rights in a zero-sum manner; 
incursions on property interests are inevitable.79
B. POLITICAL DISINCENTIVES FOR JUDICIAL PROPERTY 
ACTIVISM 
 On the whole, 
however, state courts exercise a high baseline of restraint with 
respect to property rights through doctrines and norms that 
serve the prophylactic purpose now envisioned for judicial tak-
ings.  
In the judicial takings debate, the divided scholarly litera-
ture depicts state court judges as anti-majoritarian bulwarks 
aligned with the rule of law or as political actors requiring re-
 
 77. See Rose, supra note 50, at 597–601.  
 78. For example, contrary to the doctrinal wisdom that most courts con-
sider state of mind irrelevant to adverse possession, R.H. Helmholz’s classic 
study found that courts generally rule against adverse possessors when there 
is evidence that their encroachments are intentional. See R.H. Helmholz, Ad-
verse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339–41 (1983). 
In a similar vein, the doctrine of changed circumstances enables courts to 
modify covenants in light of changed circumstances. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (2012). However, state courts typically 
require not mere changed circumstances but rather the impossibility of ac-
complishing the servitude’s purpose or something extremely close to it before a 
court will modify or terminate a servitude. See, e.g., Rick v. West, 228 
N.Y.S.2d 195, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (denying a change of covenant to per-
mit sale to a non-residential buyer even though portions of the neighborhood 
were unusable for residential purposes). 
 79. For example, nuisance law generally confronts the private right to 
commit a nuisance versus the private property right to be free of the nuisance. 
See, e.g., Ark. Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 477 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Ark. 
1972); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999). Incursion on someone’s private rights is inevitable and courts generally 
apply cost-benefit analysis to determine rights allocations. See Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 967 (2004). Similarly, some of the common limitations in joint tenancies 
and concurrent estates that may seem at first blush to be appropriating or re-
distributing property rights are in fact trying to protect and balance property 
interests among multiple owners. See, e.g., Yale B. Griffith, Community Prop-
erty in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87, 95 (1961). 
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straint through judicial takings.80 Critics of judicial takings 
maintain that the doctrine disparages the anti-majoritarian 
role of the judge and subverts the autonomy of state courts.81 
Opposing commentators, and the Stop the Beach plurality, fear 
that political influence over state court judges will translate in-
to redistribution of private property rights and weaken the le-
gitimacy of the courts.82
 
 80. In some respects, this divide maps onto the scholarly debate between 
legal formalism (i.e., rule of law judging) and a branch of legal realism that 
advocates that law is indeterminate and instead judges should consider politi-
cal and economic factors. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE 
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 52–53 
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2003).  
 This Article departs from this binary 
debate. I contend that state court judges are politically respon-
sive bodies and that this fact undermines the claimed need for 
judicial takings. Judicial politics, particularly in an age of 
property rights interest groups, more often than not cuts in fa-
vor of property rights stability and against radical divestment 
of private property rights. My argument is not that political re-
sponsiveness, standing alone, justifies federal Takings Clause 
immunity for state courts; if that were the case we would need 
to exempt legislatures from takings liability as politically re-
sponsive institutions. As I will explore in detail in Part IV, tak-
ings federalism and common law development are also at the 
heart of the case for eschewing judicial takings. My point here 
is that the political responsiveness of state courts is a factor 
that limits the strain on state legislative checks (which are too 
variable and resource intensive to serve as a first-line defense) 
and maintains stable systems of property rights. 
 81. See Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Tak-
ings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461–67 (2010) (arguing that judicial takings 
doctrine undermines state sovereignty and impedes the evolution of the com-
mon law); see also Christie, supra note 16, at 23; cf. Echeverria, supra note 27, 
at 300 (“[I]n the last few years, pro-business groups have mounted major cam-
paigns to influence state environmental policies by altering the composition of 
the state courts.”). William P. Marshall has gone further to express concern 
that the Supreme Court’s framing of judges as political actors will become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy that will weaken the legitimacy not only of state courts 
but ultimately of federal courts and the Supreme Court as well. Marshall, su-
pra note 38, at 25–28. 
 82. See Somin, supra note 39, at 100 (noting that one way that the “‘ma-
joritarian’ argument against the judicial takings doctrine errs [is] in assuming 
. . . that courts are insulated from majoritarian pressures”); John C. Yoo, In 
Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781–82 (2001); cf. 
Marshall, supra note 38, at 33–34 (arguing that judicial takings will increase 
political behavior by judges by eroding norms against such behavior and less-
ening its stigma). 
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Across the nation, the political and cultural demand for 
private property protection is robust and growing, as evidenced 
by both interest group politics and empirical research.83 Power-
ful property rights interest groups have proliferated and the 
“wise use” conservative property movement has gained power 
in the western states. Conservative and business interest 
groups, who typically support strong private property protec-
tion, provide almost half of all judicial campaign money and are 
highly influential in judicial recalls.84 The precise degree to 
which politics influences judges is unknowable—even if self-
report on this topic was forthcoming, it would not be credible. 
However, it seems implausible that politics and the strong 
(though not unlimited) public support for private property 
rights protection have no influence over state court judges. 
Empirical research supports this intuition.85 Even if political 
pressures merely reinforce existing legal and doctrinal property 
rights protections by increasing their salience in judges’ minds, 
this reduces the propensity for judicial “takings” that commen-
tators and the Court intimate follow from political influence.86
Alexander Bickel’s classic formulation of the 
“countermajoritarian problem” of judicial review is nowhere 
more doubtful than at the state court level.
  
87
 
 83. See, e.g., JUSTIN LEWIS, CONSTRUCTING PUBLIC OPINION 96 (2001); 
Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPIN-
ION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286, 288–90 (Nathaniel Persily et al. 
eds., 2008); NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., AUGUST 22–29, 2008 NATIONAL CON-
STITUTION CENTER POLL, Q15 (2008), http://surveys.ap.org/data/SRBI/AP 
-National%20Constitution%20Center%20Poll.pdf. Admittedly, survey data has 
limitations based on the questions asked, the framing of questions, the hypo-
thetical nature of the questions, etc. However, survey data is one source of in-
formation and like other indicators, such as the growing number of property 
protection interests groups, the empirical data reveals healthy, though not 
unqualified, public sentiments favoring property protection. 
 State courts re-
 84. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002: HOW THE THREAT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
COURTS SPREAD TO MORE STATES IN 2002, at 9 (Bert Brandenburg ed., 2002), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3e06222f06bc229762_yom6bgubs.pdf. 
 85. For a summary of the research on the effect of election on judging, see 
generally CHRIS W. BONNEAU, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERN-
ING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Federalist Soc’y ed., 2012), available at http://www 
.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2012wp.pdf. 
 86. In addition, judges imbibe the sanctity of private property by cultural 
and moral beliefs and may be more likely to endorse private property protec-
tion and stability of property rights because they are typically upper-income 
property owners themselves.  
 87. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SU-
PREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (2d ed. 1986). 
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spond to majoritarian interests in many respects, including 
through standards of common usage and the “ordinary person” 
as well as implicitly by privileging efficiency (which often corre-
sponds to the interests of large numbers of citizens). Most pow-
erfully, the pervasiveness of elections, and of election recalls, 
casts doubt on the countermajoritarian character of state 
courts.88 Curiously, the academic commentary on judicial tak-
ings has not examined the prevalence of state court elections 
and the implications for the judicial takings debate.89 At the 
trial court level, 64% of the states elect their trial court judges, 
mostly in nonpartisan elections, and 14% of the states employ 
periodic retention elections.90 For intermediate appellate 
courts, 80% of states hold initial elections or uncontested reten-
tion elections.91 For state supreme court justices, 42% of states 
hold initial elections, and 34% have uncontested retention elec-
tions after initial appointment.92 And, of course, many state su-
preme court justices were previously lower court judges who 
have already passed through the electoral filter. Notably, elec-
tion is a costly process with state supreme court candidates, for 
example, spending a total of $45.6 million during the 2000 judi-
cial elections.93
Two major areas of electoral influence over judicial proper-
ty rights decision-making are the initial “filtering” process of 
election and the threat of judicial recall once elected. First, in a 
climate where making the case that one will not be activist on 
the bench is a near requirement for election, successful candi-
dates are likely to skew toward property conservatism.
 
94
 
 88. See infra note 
 It also 
seems likely that individuals willing to run for election self-
90. 
 89. Much of the scholarly discussion about judicial takings appears to un-
derappreciate the prevalence of judicial elections in state courts. See, e.g., 
Christie, supra note 16, at 23–27; Marshall, supra note 38, at 25–28; Peñalver 
& Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 331. But see Somin, supra note 39, at 96–101 
(arguing that judicial politics play a role in takings). 
 90. See Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (last visited Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. Average per judge spending in partisan supreme court elections in 
2000 was $380,000. Id. 
 94. This process occurs with appointment too, because it influences who is 
proposed and the outcomes of confirmation processes as well, but the inquiry 
may be more prolonged in the election setting and, of course, revisited in re-
tention elections.  
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select based on a higher degree of political savvy and sensitivi-
ty (appointment systems for judges presumably involve poli-
ticking too but in a more limited form). The majority of cam-
paign financing comes from business and conservative interest 
groups (the Republican Party and the National Organization 
for Marriage have been major contributors in many states in 
recent years).95 Candidates that appear activist or likely to 
eradicate established private property rights are unlikely to re-
ceive support from these interests.96
A second point of political vulnerability for state court 
judges is from recall in retention elections. Historically, reten-
tion elections (often uncontested elections with a yes/no reten-
tion vote) exerted negligible political pressure and resulted in 
retention by wide margins for virtually all judges.
 In addition to filtering, 
election is also an acculturation process where popular, interest 
group, and legislative disapproval of activism is impressed up-
on the candidate. 
97 Rejecting 
political process as an adequate protective against judicial tak-
ings, William Fischel wrote in 1995 that he would take serious-
ly the political accountability of judges only “when someone 
tells me of a judge being unelected because of unpopular deci-
sions less prominent than the death penalty.”98 In recent years, 
this has come to pass with recalls in multiple states, including 
recalls resulting from property rights cases. An Idaho justice 
lost a retention election because voters were angered over her 
opinion that congressional designation of three Idaho wilder-
ness areas included federal reserved water rights senior to pri-
vate agricultural and commercial water rights.99
 
 95. See ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL., THE 
NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009–10: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST “SU-
PER SPENDERS” THREATENED IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND EMBOLDENED UNPREC-
EDENTED LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON AMERICA’S COURTS 3 (Oct. 2011), http:// 
brennan.3cdn.net/23b60118bc49d599bd_35m6yyon3.pdf. 
 In response to 
a 2009 decision invalidating Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage, 
 96. See id. at 9 (describing power of business and special interests in judi-
cial elections). 
 97. See Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law, and 
the Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 69–70 
(2012). 
 98. See FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 332. 
 99. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Ju-
diciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122, 
122–24 (2001); see also In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 
1999), superseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 
(Idaho 2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion).  
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voters ousted three Iowa Supreme Court judges.100 Alaska Su-
preme Court Justice Dana Fabe was nearly removed after her 
votes in abortion cases by recall efforts funded by a group called 
Alaska Family Action.101 The Tea Party led the charge to re-
move two justices from the Florida Supreme Court for not al-
lowing citizens to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment 
to bar the state from requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance.102 Threats and agitation to recall judges have be-
come an accepted aspect of the public debate over controversial 
state court property decisions.103
In the Stop the Beach plurality opinion and the ensuing 
debate about judicial takings, there has been a curious neglect 
of the fact that if judges are influenced by electoral pressure 
and public opinion, this more often favors protecting existing 
private property entitlements. Of course, there are instances 
where a powerful interest group or citizen majority, with inter-
ests affected by the judicial resolution, might influence a state 
court to eliminate or redistribute private property rights. In 
most cases, however, property rights activism is risky for an 
elected state court judge in light of the intense public opposi-
tion to judicial property redistribution and the strong influence 
of conservative interests in judicial elections and recalls. The 
politics of judicial elections also cuts against concerns that 
judges will favor upholding state legislative enactments at the 
expense of private property rights.
  
104 A judge’s professional po-
litical allegiance, if she has any, is likely to be to a major cam-
paign contributor or powerful special interest rather than the 
legislature.105
 
 100. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Ac-
countability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 118 (2010). 
 There are majoritarian safeguards as well. Not 
 101. See Tracy Kalytiak, Mailer Targets Justice: Nonprofit Targets State 
Supreme Court Judge, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN, Oct. 29, 2010, at A2. 
 102. See William Gibson, Tea Partiers Campaign Against Justices, SUN 
SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2010, http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/ 
dcblog/2010/09/tea_partiers_campaign_against.html. 
 103. In a recent Colorado case, for example, there was some agitation for 
judicial recall after a Boulder couple lost part of their land when the judge ap-
plied clear, well-established statutory and common law on adverse possession. 
See Heath Urie, Boulder’s Infamous ‘Land-Grab’ Case Settled, BOULDER DAILY 
CAMERA, http://www.dailycamera.com/ongoing-coverage/adverse-possesion 
-case/ci_13106856 (last updated Aug. 14, 2009). 
 104. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29 (noting the po-
tential for coordination between the judiciary and legislature in Takings 
Clause cases). 
 105. See SKAGGS ET AL., supra note 95, at 3–7. 
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only is the public generally suspicious of state appropriations of 
private property rights, there is some evidence that people are 
deeply angered when appropriations occur through seeming 
manipulation or arbitrage between state actors, in this case 
state courts and legislatures.106
II.  A POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
TAKINGS: STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS OF STATE 
COURT ACTIVISM   
  
When state courts overreach in property rights cases, state 
legislatures often check them through legislative revision. To 
date, there has been little attention to the institutional capacity 
and competence of state legislatures to check state courts. The 
Supreme Court plurality in Stop the Beach assumed that feder-
al courts are the best-situated actors to address state court 
property rights abuses.107 The mounting scholarship on judicial 
takings has focused on state versus federal judicial review.108 
The inattention to state legislatures may stem from the broader 
neglect of legislative checks of courts, federal or state, in our 
conception of the rights-protective function of separation of 
powers and checks and balances.109
In the legal scholarship, several scholars have argued that 
the protections and correctives afforded by political process 
counsel a more limited role for Takings Clause protection 
against legislative acts. John Hart Ely theorizes that judicial 
 This Article fills that void 
by advancing a theory of legislative process protection against 
judicial takings and examining the benefits, and gaps, of state 
legislative checks of courts.  
 
 106. Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond’s research provides evi-
dence that manipulation and arbitrage by government actors heightens public 
outrage and produces very strong perceptions of unfairness and wrongdoing. 
See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psy-
chology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker 
Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 745 (2008).  
 107. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–02 (2010). 
 108. See, e.g., supra note 4. 
 109. There is a large body of scholarship exploring how judicial review, 
which enables courts to trump the decisions of popularly elected and politically 
accountable legislatures, provides an important check on political action. See, 
e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 197–99 (1952); cf. Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the 
Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Consti-
tutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 856 (2008) (positing that continued 
empirical study of judicial behavior has limited benefits).  
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review of legislative acts should occur to correct failures of 
democratic process—that is, when legislators act undemocrati-
cally to exclude or dilute minority interests or establish dual 
regulatory regimes with less advantageous regulation of minor-
ity interests.110 William Fischel’s theory of regulatory takings 
predicates a circumscribed role for takings doctrine on robust 
coalition politics at the national and state level (more question-
ably, he argues that takings should focus on policing against 
local government incentives to behave unfairly to minority in-
terests).111 Taking a somewhat different tack, Daniel Farber ob-
serves that a no compensation rule for takings is more likely to 
reduce rent seeking and pork-barrel projects than compensa-
tion, which buys off the group “most likely to bring costs force-
fully to the attention of legislators.”112 The reason for compen-
sation in his view is that lobbying by the dispossessed (who are 
discrete, insular, and strongly interested minorities with more 
power than diffuse majorities) will block not only inefficient 
government projects but also efficient and desirable ones.113 
Marc Poirier takes issue with the sweeping nature of these ac-
counts and argues for context-specific approaches to public 
choice and legislative takings.114
 To date, there has been no serious examination of the im-
plications of state political process for judicial takings. This Ar-
ticle considers legislative checks from multiple states, focusing 
  
 
 110. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980); John 
Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World 
Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 834 n.4 
(1991). 
 111. FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 7, 139 (“Local insiders can use regulation in 
a way that subverts the Constitution’s clear command not to take property 
without compensation. The larger republics are less subject to that temptation 
because the burden of regulation is more likely to fall on properly represented 
insiders and their progeny.”). The conclusion about local government is the 
most tenuous aspect of his theory, and its assumptions have been soundly crit-
icized by localist Carol M. Rose. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, 
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1133–37, 1140 (1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra 
note 2). 
 112. See Farber, supra note 29, at 292–93; cf. Saul Levmore, Just Compen-
sation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 308–11 (1990) (noting that tak-
ings compensation protects powerless individuals and groups). 
 113. See Farber, supra note 29, at 295–98. 
 114. See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public 
Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 246–47, 260–61 (1993) 
(questioning takings compensation for prohibitions on building in beach are-
as).  
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on the cases of Conatser v. Johnson,115 Gion v. City of Santa 
Cruz,116 and Robinson v. Ariyoshi.117 These case studies illus-
trate how state legislatures have revised activist state court 
property decisions, including controversial cases of water and 
shoreline rights and public recreational access. In some cases, 
these checks functionally reversed the court decision; in other 
instances legislatures have partially checked or tempered dra-
matic judicial changes to the common law.118
In most cases, legislative checks restore the bulk of the 
private property right and sometimes “pay off the losers” in a 
conflict with in-kind or other benefits. As I will describe in the 
following Sections, state legislative checks have additional ad-
vantages, including offering swifter redress and democratic 
process, signaling legislative property norms, strengthening 
legislatures’ constitutional commitments, and creating disin-
centives for future judicial activism. Importantly, state legisla-
tive checks also offer a better fit to takings federalism than fed-
eral court review of state judicial takings, a point I take up in 
Part IV.
 Concededly, there 
are a limited number of examples of state legislative checks. 
This is not because state legislatures are insufficiently con-
cerned with property rights, but in large part because state 
court doctrines, norms, and politics make radical judicial ap-
propriations of property rights an unusual occurrence. Legisla-
tive checks are high-cost endeavors in the currencies of effort, 
time, and political capital, and cannot function effectively as a 
first-line defense against property activism. Accordingly, legis-
lative checks have co-evolved with state judicial restraint into a 
functional system of property protection. 
119
 
 115. 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008). 
  
 116. 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970). 
 117. 477 U.S. 902 (1986). 
 118. For example, in a case against a common interest community—the 
type of private party case which may be included in the broad auspices of the 
Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings doctrine—the California Supreme 
Court replaced the longstanding rule of judicial review of common interest 
community association decisions with a rule of extreme deference, seemingly 
to avoid straining judicial resources. The legislature acquiesced to the change 
in law but created exceptions for an interest dear to the hearts of Californi-
ans—owners with pets. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 
1275, 1278 (Cal. 1994), rev’d in part by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5 (West 
2012).  
 119. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Political forces, as well as concerns for state policy and 
constitutional rights, affect legislative checks of judicial proper-
ty abuses.120
A. STATE LEGISLATIVE REVISION: THE CASE STUDY OF 
CONATSER V. JOHNSON 
 As I will discuss in Section III.C, legislatures may 
fail to check judicial overreaching that has majoritarian or 
strong interest group support. Legislatures are also unlikely to 
revise state court judgments that validate favored state stat-
utes or avoid state payment of compensation. However, the fact 
that vigorous interest groups on different sides of an issue are 
common in property conflicts reduces the frequency of legisla-
tive inaction and dysfunctional responses substantially. Ex 
ante high baselines of state court restraint also attenuate the 
impact of variable legislative responses.  
The case study of Conatser v. Johnson offers a closer view 
of the legislative check and the interactions between state 
courts and legislatures over property rights. In Conatser, the 
Utah Supreme Court expanded a common law easement for 
public recreation on non-navigable waters to include not only 
the long-established right to float but also the right to directly 
and non-incidentally touch private water beds when wading, 
boating, fishing, swimming, or engaging in other forms of water 
recreation.121 By statute, all the waters in the state are the 
property of the public, but in non-navigable waters, the majori-
ty in Utah, the waterbeds are mostly privately owned.122
 
 120. For example, in a recent conflict over recreational access in Utah’s 
streams and rivers following a judicial decision expanding public rights, pri-
vate owners, farmers, anglers and wildlife, recreation, and environmental 
groups lobbied the legislature aggressively in response to the court decision 
and subsequent legislative bills. See Editorial, Closed to Fishing, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Feb. 13, 2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11701247& 
itype=NGPSID (describing opposition to public recreational use of streambeds 
by homeowners and farmers who own property along the rivers); Brett 
Prettyman, Finally, Water Lovers in the Same Boat, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 19, 
2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11743015&itype=NGPSID (de-
scribing anglers, duck hunters, and kayakers descending on the Utah State 
Capitol armed with waders, paddles, nets, and duck calls to protest the initial 
bill proposed in response to the state supreme court decision broadening ac-
cess). 
 A prior 
precedent, J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah, had established a common law 
 121. 194 P.3d 897, 902–03 (Utah 2008). The court saw this shift from prior 
common law as “necessary for the effective enjoyment of all the rights provid-
ed for in the easement.” Id. at 902.  
 122. See id. at 900. 
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easement in the public to “utilize” non-navigable waters for rec-
reation.123 However, the Court in J.J.N.P. Co. indicated via ci-
tation to another case that the right was limited to “floating” on 
the water (not stopping, wading, or fishing).124 This had been 
the accepted interpretation and popular understanding for al-
most three decades. In 2008, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Conatser v. Johnson abruptly eliminated riparian owners’ pri-
vate property rights to non-navigable water beds.125 Based on 
the common law doctrine that easement owners possess the 
corollary rights “to do such acts as are necessary to make effec-
tive his or her enjoyment of the easement,” the court reinter-
preted the public right to “utilize” to include wading and fishing 
while standing on private riverbeds.126
Within months, Utah Representative Ben C. Ferry pro-
posed a bill to limit the public recreational rights granted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Conatser to floating, with only inci-
dental touching of private riverbeds, on fourteen rivers speci-
fied in the bill.
 The holding effectively 
opened fishable Utah riverbeds to anglers and to the commer-
cial recreational angling industry by enabling wading near pri-
vate shores.  
127
 
 123. The J.J.N.P. Co. court held that the Utah statute providing that all 
waters are the property of the public, coupled with other statutory provisions 
requiring the State Engineer to consider public recreational uses prior to ap-
proving applications for appropriation and permits for stream relocation, cre-
ated an easement for the public to engage in recreational uses when utilizing 
the water. 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (“[T]he public . . . has the right to 
float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when uti-
lizing that water.” (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 137 (Wyo. 1961))); 
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (West 2012) (application for appropriation); 
id. § 73-3-29 (stream relocation permit).  
 Interest groups, including Utah Trout Unlim-
ited, the Utah River Council, the newly formed Utah Water 
Guardians, and the $700 million Utah commercial fishing in-
dustry responded with public protests at the State Capitol 
 124. See 655 P.2d at 1137. 
 125. Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902–03. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Recreational Use of Public Waters, H.B. 187, 2009 Gen. Sess. 
(Utah 2009). In addition, under the bill, the public would not be able to fish at 
all within 500 feet of a single family dwelling that had posted a no fishing no-
tice. See Public Access to Private Stream Beds, H.B. 80, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 
2010). A controversial aspect of the legislative process was the fact that a leg-
islator and his family owned land on one of the rivers that would now be closed 
to public fishing under Representative Ferry’s proposed bill. See Tom Whar-
ton, Stream Bill Would Protect Lawmaker’s Land, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 25, 
2009, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_11784137.  
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brandishing paddles and fishing rods, meetings with repre-
sentative Ferry, and professional lobbying of the legislature.128 
After multiple substitutions of Ferry’s bill and twenty amend-
ments, the bill was defeated. The following year, a more mod-
erate bill, the Utah Public Waters Access Act, was enacted.129
The Public Waters Access Act restored most of the property 
rights to the private riverbed owners, the original entitlement 
holders. Pursuant to the statute, recreationists have the right 
to touch streambeds only “incidentally” to flotation (i.e., boat-
ing, fishing from a boat, or other activities upon the surface of 
the water).
  
130 While the Public Waters Access Act mostly re-
turned the law to the pre-Conatser state of play, it did offer 
several lower-value benefits to recreationists. They gained the 
right to portage (lifting and walking watercraft around obsta-
cles).131 Although some Utah common law precedents on public 
water rights appeared to support a right of portage, the right 
had not crystallized in the state’s common law.132 The Act also 
created a public adverse possession right when a riverbed has 
been used by the public for at least ten consecutive years133 and 
prohibited private owners from stringing barbed wire across 
the rivers to keep boaters out.134 Following the passage of the 
Act, the Division of Wildlife sought to expand its “Walk-in Ac-
cess” program, which leases land and waterbeds from private 
owners for public access, fishing, and wading.135
 
 128. See Prettyman, supra note 
  
120 (describing rally); Tom Wharton, An-
glers Rally to Fight Stream Access Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 19, 2009, http:// 
archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11744385&itype=NGPSID (quoting a repre-
sentative from Utah Water Guardians about public rights); Tom Wharton, Bill 
to Limit Riverbed Access Clears First Hurdle, Passes House Panel, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Feb. 23, 2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11767346&itype= 
NGPSID (quoting the state chair of Utah Trout Unlimited on the unfairness of 
bill H.B. 187). 
 129. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -208 (West 2012). 
 130. Id. § 73-29-202. 
 131. Id. § 73-29-202(2)(a)–(b). The Act limits the public’s right to float in 
water that on the whole has “sufficient width, depth, and flow to allow free 
passage of the chosen vessel at the time of floating.” Id. § 73-29-202(1). 
 132. The portage right is an advance in public access rights but it accrues 
to a minority of river recreational users, boaters and rafters.  
 133. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-203. The value of this benefit may turn out 
to be minimal because prevailing on the adverse possession claim involves rig-
orous proof and an expensive legal process to quiet title. See id. § 73-29-204 
(describing procedural and other requirements for a quiet title action). 
 134. See id. § 73-29-207(1)–(2) (limiting fencing to agricultural and live-
stock fences that do not endanger public water users). 
 135. See Walk-in Access, UTAH DIV. OF WILDLIFE RES., http://wildlife.utah 
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The Utah case study reveals a more complex set of legisla-
tive motivations than the dominant rent-seeking model, where 
legislatures award the political spoils to the most powerful in-
terest group.136 In Conatser, both the riverbed owners and the 
anglers were formidable interests (the anglers included the 
multi-million dollar tourist fishing industry and the powerful 
interest group Trout Unlimited).137
The legislative history and statutory declarations record 
the state legislature’s frustration with the Utah Supreme Court 
for, in their view, violating the state’s constitutional property 
protections.
 Interest group power did not 
clearly predict the outcome; the comparative strength of both 
interests should have yielded a more middle of the road divi-
sion of rights. Instead, the legislature appeared motivated in 
substantial part to secure Utah’s constitutional takings provi-
sions against the state supreme court’s sudden departure from 
precedent and to foster political accommodation. 
138 In the statute’s declarations, the legislature took 
the Conatser court to task, admonishing that the “general con-
stitutional and statutory provisions declaring public ownership 
of water and recognizing existing rights of use are insufficient 
to overcome the specific constitutional protections for private 
property.”139 The statute emphasized that the Utah Constitu-
tion’s “prohibition on taking or damaging private property for 
public use without just compensation, protect[s] against gov-
ernment’s broad recognition or grant of a public recreation 
easement to access or use public water on private property.”140
 
.gov/walkinaccess/ (last updated Aug. 31, 2012). 
 
Political pressure and interest group lobbying were undeniably 
important to the legislature, but apparently so was the consti-
tutional affront to private property in the Conatser decision.  
 136. Cf. supra note 1. 
 137. See Tom Wharton, Bill Would Limit Fishing Ground Access, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_11684170 (interview-
ing the head of the Utah Rivers Council, who described the large financial 
value of Utah fishing). 
 138. See Jeremiah I. Williamson, Stream Wars: The Constitutionality of the 
Utah Public Waters Access Act, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 315, 317, 323 
(2011).  
 139. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(1)–(2) (West 2012) (establishing water 
access as a takings issue). 
 140. Id. § 72-29-103(3)–(6) (describing the legislature’s intent to address 
the Conatser holding and restore the property rights as they existed prior to 
Conatser).  
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B. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE: ADVANTAGES 
OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS 
State legislative checks have an array of institutional 
strengths. State legislatures are knowledgeable about state 
property issues, competing demands and interest groups in the 
state, and the preferences of the state’s citizenry and can craft 
legislation accordingly. Importantly, legislative revision of state 
court overreaching enables middle ground solutions, innova-
tion, and implicit compensation for the losers in a property con-
flict. Legislative checks provide signals to the state’s citizens 
about legislative commitments to property protection and can 
create beneficial second-order effects on courts. The revisionary 
role of the state legislature also creates court-legislature “net-
works” that may help to develop state property law as contro-
versies pass between these institutions. These benefits weigh in 
balance against the primary disadvantage of legislative 
checks—the fact that checks may not occur in every instance 
they are needed because of limited institutional resources or 
political dynamics.  
1. Intermediate Solutions and Political Accommodation  
Intermediate solutions and political accommodation are 
key advantages of state legislative checks—advantages which 
may be muted or chilled under a federal judicial takings doc-
trine. Legislatures who check courts have the institutional ca-
pacity to offer middle ground solutions, often by restoring the 
bulk, but not all, of the property right.141
Contrary to intuition, legislative enactments that adopt 
middle ground solutions and “split the baby” in terms of rights 
may more accurately reflect the competing threads of the com-
 Although not inevita-
bly the case, legislative middle ground solutions have the po-
tential to be more efficient and politically palatable, as well as 
truer to the common law, than the binary rights determination 
of a judicial taking. Legislatures can also step back from the 
case at hand and address a need for comprehensive regulation 
in an area of property or water law. In contrast, courts are lim-
ited by the pleadings in the particular case, legal doctrines and 
precedents, and a reviewing court’s inability to craft compre-
hensive regulatory approaches (as opposed to iterative rules).  
 
 141. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009 (West 2007) (providing opportunity for 
public access to property, while maintaining property owner’s rights); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 462.357 subdiv. 6(2) (West 2011). 
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mon law as a whole than stylized federal judicial review of judi-
cial takings (which would typically select a single case or line of 
cases as the definitive precedent). This does not occur because 
legislatures perceive their mission as interpreting the common 
law. Rather, it occurs because the common law frequently im-
plicates interests in investment, stability, and fairness of the 
kind that legislatures consider—and because the underlying 
judicial decision and lobbying interest groups bring relevant 
precedents to the legislature’s attention.142 In many areas, in-
cluding water law, the common law includes a multitude of 
precedents and the holdings are multiplex, waxing and waning, 
or checkered.143
Intermediate solutions also allow political accommodation 
and “paying off losers,” a critical aspect of property rights tran-
sitions described in Gary Libecap’s work.
 Federal court appellate review of a judicial tak-
ings claim would likely select a single “correct” common law 
rule from the relevant precedents. But is this a superior meth-
od of common law interpretation? In some instances, a check-
ered pattern or competing threads to the common law may 
support a legislative rule that “sums” the various precedents 
into an intermediate or hybrid approach not specifically articu-
lated in prior precedents.  
144 Fifth Amendment 
compensation for judicial takings is not the only way to com-
pensate for property transitions. State legislatures can, and of-
ten do, craft intermediate solutions that pay off losers through 
implicit or non-monetary compensation. As Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith note, “legislature[s] can devise various means for 
affording implicit compensation to those adversely affected by 
the change . . . . [C]ourts will often not have the losers before 
them and in any event are endowed with a limited set of op-
tions in devising remedies.”145
 
 142. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 
144–45 (1988). 
 A common outcome of a legisla-
tive check of a state court decision is to restore most or all of 
the private property entitlement and to offer some mitigating 
 143. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the 
New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770–71 (2001) (describing the evolution 
of the water law doctrine of prior appropriation). 
 144. Gary Libecap has most famously illustrated the importance of paying 
off losers in his study of oil field unitization. See Gary Libecap et al., Contract-
ing for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND 
LAW 142, 156–64 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). 
 145. Merrill & Smith, supra note 63, at 65. 
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rights, benefits, or other form of compensation to the losers in a 
property rights conflict.146 For example, the statute overturning 
Conatser provided recreationists with portage rights, adverse 
possession rights for longstanding public use, and redress for 
the problem of private owners stringing barbed wire across riv-
ers.147 This is not to say the losers in this dispute were perfectly 
satisfied (they are presently litigating the constitutionality of 
the legislative revision).148
Compared to federal judicial review, the process of state 
legislative revision is a more democratic and, at times, a more 
politically palatable resolution. Legislatures are close to state 
citizens’ and interest groups’ sentiments and can use that in-
formation in crafting solutions and offering implicit compensa-
tion.
 However, the legislative process of-
fered them a forum and certain benefits that may not have oc-
curred if the riparian owners succeeded in a judicial takings 
claim. 
149 William Marshall has lauded judicial review of legisla-
tion as “end[ing] the debate without the possibility of political 
compromise. . . . [making it] far more definitive in defeating the 
popular will than are the other countermajoritarian struc-
tures.”150 However, in the context of property rights, which are 
often high-stakes, contested by multiple claimants, and subject 
to competing threads in the common law, it is often not a sim-
ple story of majoritarian wrongdoing, but rather a complex and 
opaque array of conflicting interests. The legislative check, in-
formed by public input and interest group lobbying and subject 
to later judicial review, may move us closer to a property dis-
tribution that balances property protection, political senti-
ments, and social needs.151
 
 146. The balance between accommodation and rights restoration is a 
fraught one, as evidenced by the Utah legislature’s statement of its intent “to 
foster restoration of the accommodation existing between recreational users 
and private property owners before the decision in Conatser v. Johnson.” UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(6) (West 2012). 
  
 147. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. ATC Realty, No. 100500558, slip op. 
(Utah Dist. Ct. May 21, 2012). 
 149. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from 
One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 887, 898 (1987) (describing Roscoe Pound’s belief that “legisla-
tion was the most democratic form of lawmaking,” and that the common law 
“could not address the needs of modern society”). 
 150. See Marshall, supra note 38, at 30.  
 151. For example, following legislative revision of the Utah Supreme Court 
decision redistributing private property rights in riverbeds to the public, the 
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2. Framing Legislation and Public Acceptance: The Example 
of Gion v. City of Santa Cruz 
State legislatures can increase political acceptance of nec-
essary revisions of state court decisions by emphasizing the 
consensus elements of a property rule or the benefits to the 
public of stable private property rights. Gion v. City of Santa 
Cruz offers an instructive example of such framing. In the con-
solidated cases of Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King, 
the California Supreme Court departed dramatically from past 
precedents and extended the common law of implied dedication, 
previously applied only to roadways, to create a public recrea-
tional easement in private beaches.152 If members of the public 
walked across or used private beachfront property for more 
than five years, believing they had the right to such use and 
with no bona fide attempt by the landowner to exclude them, 
then the public acquired recreational use rights through im-
plied dedication.153 Soon after Gion, a California lower court re-
duced landowner compensation for a condemnation because it 
held that most of the area was subject to an implied dedication 
based on past public use.154 The change in the common law was 
so radical that Michael Berger, writing in a 1971 law review ar-
ticle, charged that the Gion court had violated the constitution-
al prohibition on takings.155
The California Supreme Court in Gion had premised their 
decision in part on the importance of assuring public access to 
  
 
newly founded Utah Stream Access Coalition is currently appealing the legis-
lative enactment on the theory that the Act violates Article XVII of the Utah 
Constitution, which recognizes, “[a]ll existing rights to the use of any of the 
waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose” and that existing 
rights at the time of statehood included public riverbed access. UTAH CONST. 
art. XVII; see also Williamson, supra note 138, at 329–33.  
 152. 465 P.2d 50, 60–61 (Cal. 1970). This case was a radical change from 
prior state precedents. See Breidert v. S. Pac. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Ct. 
App. 1969); People v. Lundy, 47 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
 153. See Gion, 465 P.2d at 56–58. Notably, the California Supreme Court 
held that intermittently posting no trespassing signs was not adequate in the 
specific cases before it, because the signs “cannot reasonably be expected to 
halt a continuous influx of beach users to an attractive seashore property.” Id. 
at 58. 
 154. Richard E. Llewellyn II, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedi-
cation and Its Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner: Gion v. City 
of Santa Cruz, 4 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 438, 447 (1971). 
 155. Michael M. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least They Lose Their 
Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 75, 93–94 (1971). 
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the waterfront.156 However, the case had the opposite effect. 
Beachfront property owners immediately began to block public 
access, with news reports of owners building fences topped with 
barbed wire or with cactuses spread across the base, implant-
ing traps such as old automobile transmissions in the ground to 
block vehicles, and hiring guards.157
The California legislature responded with laws that re-
versed the California Supreme Court by prohibiting public use 
of private property from ripening into a vested right unless the 
owner had made an express written irrevocable offer of dedica-
tion.
  
158 The statute focused on the benefits to the public of re-
moving the threat to beachfront owners’ private property. It 
began with the finding that “[i]t is in the best interests of the 
state to encourage owners of private real property to continue 
to make their lands available for public recreational use . . . .”159 
The next findings elaborated on the unintended consequence to 
the public of the Court’s decision and described how the threat-
ened loss of private rights compelled owners to exclude the pub-
lic.160 Californians at the time were likely not poring over the 
statutory text. However, the legislature’s reasoning about pro-
tecting public access by protecting private rights was the prod-
uct of a series of public deliberations that were highly publi-
cized by the media throughout the state.161
 
 156. See Gion, 465 P.2d at 58 (describing as a basis for their decision the 
“strong policy expressed in the constitution and statutes of this state of en-
couraging public use of shoreline recreational areas”).  
 By framing the 
political discourse and statute to emphasize how restoration of 
private rights benefited the public, the legislature increased the 
legitimacy and public acceptance of the enactment.  
 157. See Michael A. O’Flaherty, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of 
Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1092, 1094–95 (1971); Philip Fradkin, Fences Go up to Keep Public from 
Beaches, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1971, at C1; Philip Fradkin, Owners of Water-
way Property Rushing to Block Access Paths, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1970, pt. I, 
at 3, 25. 
 158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009(b) (West 2012). Other provisions further reas-
sured owners with clear safe harbors enabling them to record a document on 
the public record permitting public access and barring the creation of a pre-
scriptive easement when the property owner has posted signs every 200 feet 
along the boundary granting a right to pass. See id. §§ 813, 1008. 
 159. Id. § 1009(a)(1). 
 160. See id. § 1009(a)(2)–(3). 
 161. See supra note 157.  
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3. The Fast Train: State Legislative Revision 
For structural and political reasons, state legislatures act 
more quickly than the federal legislature and certainly more 
rapidly than the litigation process envisioned by the Stop the 
Beach plurality.162 Judicial takings involve a lengthy process 
with multiple rounds of litigation, removal to federal court, and 
the potential for prudential issues to short-circuit adjudication. 
For example, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, a case that commentators 
point to as an instructive example of the need for a constitu-
tional judicial takings doctrine, the litigation of the judicial tak-
ing claim lasted for decades before foundering on ripeness con-
cerns.163 The only relief the plaintiffs received was from the 
Hawaii legislature, which partially restored their rights 
through grandfathering provisions in the Water Code.164
Most legislative checks of state court property activism oc-
cur in less than two years. In Conatser, legislation was pro-
posed seven months after the state supreme court decision and 
enacted eleven months later.
  
165 The California legislature re-
sponded to Gion with an enactment in approximately eighteen 
months.166 The Minnesota legislature rectified the 
Krummenacher decision, discussed in detail in Part III, in less 
than two years.167
 
 162. A case where a judicial taking, or at least a close relation, was raised 
as a claim was Robinson v. Ariyoshi. 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989). This case 
wound its way through both state and federal courts for decades without reso-
lution, repeatedly derailing on issues of ripeness and other concerns. Id. at 
216. 
 Indeed, one might question why, since legis-
lative checks are so timely, litigants will bother to file judicial 
appeals and why judicial takings will matter at all. This view 
discounts strategic litigation decisions to appeal or threaten 
appeal, the possible compensation benefits from judicial tak-
ings claims, and the potential for judicial takings doctrine to 
“crowd out” state legislative checks by providing justifications 
for legislative inaction. Also, legislative checks are likely to be 
slower, or not occur at all, when there is strong political sup-
port for the court’s reallocation of private rights or when the 
 163. Id. at 216–18 (describing lengthy history of the case). 
 164. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-50 (2008). 
 165. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -208 (West 2010). 
 166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009(b) (West 2012). 
 167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357, subdiv. 6 (West 2011).  
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state is attempting to resolve complex property rights distribu-
tions (e.g., creating a comprehensive water rights statute).168
4. Legislative Signaling to Citizens  
 
State legislative checks of judicial overreaching also have 
expressive value. Legislative checks are “costly signals” that 
indicate that legislators disapprove of and will expend substan-
tial legislative resources to redress radical property rights re-
distribution by courts. Independent state legislative checks 
(i.e., not arising from federal order or the shadow of judicial 
takings liability) may assuage citizens’ concerns about the leg-
islature’s position on property protection and judicial activism. 
Checks which substantially revise court opinions but offer some 
accommodations for public interests communicate the legisla-
ture’s commitment to protecting private property rights while 
also safeguarding public and environmental interests. Plausi-
bly, these assurances of property protection may even increase 
tolerance for more modest property rights flux, at least if citi-
zens interpret such signals to indicate that legislatures will ad-
just property rights modestly and in socially beneficial ways, 
but not radically disrupt property rights or dispossess broad 
swathes of owners.169
Signaling suggests the value of the seemingly ineffectual 
and symbolic state legislative responses following Kelo v. City 
of New London.
 Notably, legislative checks need not re-
spond to every questionable judicial action to yield these bene-
fits. The most controversial and highly publicized court cases 
are the ones most likely to capture citizen attention and to pro-
duce a legislative check and signal. 
170 It may be that even weak legislation commu-
nicated state government concern about private property rights 
protection and legislative reluctance to support an economic 
development taking of the scope and nature of the New London 
redevelopment. The primary motivation for these laws may 
have been to garner public approval.171
 
 168. Cf. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Re-
sponse to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2168–69 (2009) (discussing effect of 
public political ignorance on state legislative action following the Kelo deci-
sion). 
 However, the extensive 
 169. See id. at 2170 (concluding that most state legislation enacted after 
Kelo was ineffective). 
 170. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 171. See Somin, supra note 168, at 2165 (explaining how “state legislatures 
[sought] to satisfy vote demands by supporting . . . legislation that purported 
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process of lawmaking, including well-publicized hearings and 
statements by public officials, provided reassurances to citizens 
that property protection mattered to their legislators. Of 
course, the value of the legislative signal is not divorced entire-
ly from content—strong substantive laws increase the strength 
and sincerity of the signal. In the context of legislative checks, 
which are not symbolic but instead reverse or substantially re-
vise court property redistributions, the signal to the state’s citi-
zenry about legislative intent and the limits on state courts is 
typically quite robust. 
5. Second-Order Effects on State Courts and State Law 
Development 
The legislative check means that courts act in the shadow 
of substantive legislative revision as well as jurisdiction-
stripping legislation (and in turn, that legislatures act subject 
to judicial review). Legislative checks provide ongoing disincen-
tives for judicial radicalism with respect to private property 
rights. This is not due to generalized state court deference to 
legislatures, but because state courts act in the shadow of per-
manent legislative alteration of the law. These dynamics may 
not always be an optimal state of judging or of public-private 
property law development. But from the perspective of private 
property protection—the relevant lens for the issue of judicial 
takings—they are a significant deterrent for state court activ-
ism. 
Judges acting strategically to develop property law in a 
specific direction may behave more conservatively or incremen-
tally because a legislative response may resolve the issue in a 
disfavored direction.172 Modern empirical and legal research has 
refined the claims of legal realism through studies of judges 
acting either “attitudinally” to effectuate their ideological posi-
tions in the instant case or “strategically” to prevent backlash 
and advance their ideological agendas long-term.173
 
to curb eminent domain, while in reality having little effect”). 
 In the con-
 172. Cf. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 60 (1997) 
(discussing strategic policy decisions of judges); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELE-
MENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 15–23 (1964) (discussing the sources and in-
struments of judicial power). 
 173. Compare Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Real-
ism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832–35 (2008) (describing “attitudinal” judging 
behavior), with MURPHY, supra note 172, at 50 (describing how judges influ-
ence policy over time), and Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least 
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text of judicial property activism, the prospect of permanent 
legislative revision constrains in-the-moment, attitudinal judg-
ing that might favor elimination of private rights or radical re-
distributions in favor of stability or strategic incrementalism.  
In addition, a legislative check greatly increases negative 
publicity and public scrutiny of the state court judge—a signifi-
cant matter in an age of judicial recalls.174 If the judicial action 
is extreme enough to prompt the legislature to action, there has 
likely been media attention already. A legislative revision pro-
cess increases that attention exponentially and prolongs it over 
many months. Such publicity, coupled with the implication of 
judicial wrongdoing suggested by some forms of legislative re-
vision, can tarnish a judge’s reputation or motivate attempts to 
oust a judge through retention election recall (if state law ena-
bles recall).175
Legislative checks and the bi-directional interaction be-
tween state courts and legislatures are also important to devel-
oping and defining state property law. By this I mean not only 
the content of the legislative revision, which of course becomes 
part of state property law, but also the legislative check as an 
indicator of the degree of property flux and disrupted invest-
ment that a state will accept. For example, the federal constitu-
tional regulatory takings test and many state counterparts 
weigh “reasonable” investment-backed expectations, based on 
state law, to determine whether a state or local regulation is a 
regulatory taking.
 While publicity and politics may not fully or in-
variably constrain state court judges, undeniably they have a 
forestalling effect some of the time.  
176
 
Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness 
to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019 (2004) (“[S]trategic justices must 
gauge the prevailing winds . . . politicians and make decisions accordingly.”).  
 A state legislature that is quick to revise 
court overreaching signals a thicker approach to property 
rights protection that affects the property expectations compo-
nent of the regulatory takings test. As I will discuss in Part III, 
the Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings doctrine places 
the legislature under direct federal court order, financial du-
ress, or both to invalidate the state court decision (or to com-
 174. See Hobbs, Jr., supra note 99, at 140–43 (discussing the publicity of 
state supreme court decisions and the impact on re-election). 
 175. See Pettys, supra note 97, at 70–72 (discussing various recent at-
tempts to oust judges in retention elections). 
 176. For a description of how this approach represents implicit delegations 
to state law and courts, see Sterk, supra note 29, at 206, 231. 
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pensate). State legislative action in these circumstances does 
not send a clear signal about state legislative norms of property 
protection.  
The interplay between state legislatures and courts may 
develop property law in other ways. The current system of state 
legislative checks of judicial overreaching may encourage more 
deliberative or balanced development of state property law 
than a system of revision situated predominantly within the 
judiciary. Legislative checks of state court decisions, and poten-
tial later judicial review of the legislative revision, create mul-
tiple inputs and checks that may tend to stabilize property 
rights, or at least discourage radical action by one branch. Todd 
Zywicki’s work on the efficiency-enhancing effects of supply 
side competition among courts on the common law suggests an-
other benefit: multiple inputs can improve the quality of law 
production.177 He offers a historical account of how competition 
between common law courts motivated judges to carefully con-
ceptualize and abstract the common law and encouraged high-
quality rules and internal coherence.178
Unlike systems of overlapping common law courts, state 
legislatures and state courts do not compete for clients. Indeed, 
both might prefer not to have a property law dispute deposited 
on their institutional doorsteps. However, the fact that state 
legislatures have the authority to revise non-constitutional 
property decisions of state courts creates an analogous jurisdic-
tional overlap. As property disputes bounce between courts and 
legislatures, it may force both institutions to abstract the prin-
ciples and interests underlying property law and to think more 
conceptually and carefully about state law development. For 
example, following the legislature’s revision of Conatser, the is-
sue is presently back in state trial court to determine the con-
stitutionality of the new statute and to clarify the scope of the 
legislature’s constitutional review role under the Utah Consti-
tution.
  
179
 
 177. See Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: 
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1586 (2003). 
 This back and forth between state legislative revision 
and state court review can be a valuable part of refining and 
legitimizing legislative solutions (as well as clarifying state 
separation of powers).  
 178. See id. 
 179. See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. ATC Realty, No. 100500558, slip op. 
(Utah Dist. Ct. May 21, 2012). 
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C. GAPS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS: ROBINSON V. ARIYOSHI 
REVISITED 
Legislative checks address state court overreaching with-
out the costs of judicial takings doctrine to common law devel-
opment and takings federalism. However, legislative checks do 
not work invariably or infallibly. Public choice dynamics and 
legislative inertia may stymie legislative correction.180 Context-
specific politics and circumstances can create instability within 
the political process or political capture that produces dysfunc-
tional legislative responses.181
In many cases, vigorous interest group politics reduces the 
risk that legislative checks will fail to occur. Natural resource 
and water law cases comprise the majority of “activist” state 
supreme court property cases. These are virtually always high-
stakes cases with multiple interested parties vigorously defend-
ing their claims.
 Legislative checks are also un-
likely to occur when the court decision validates or otherwise 
benefits a statute or regulatory scheme supported by a majority 
of the state legislature. These dynamics underscore the im-
portance of state court restraint and the doctrinal and political 
forces supporting judicial conservatism with respect to property 
rights. 
182 Similarly, land use litigation often involves 
strong interests on both sides of a dispute and frequently impli-
cates the legal rights of parties not before the court.183
 
 180. Conversely, relying on state legislative checks may raise concerns that 
state legislatures will overuse legislative revision to undermine judicial re-
view. The high costs of legislative action, state constitutional restrictions, and 
judicial review of legislative revisions sharply constrain such behavior from 
legislatures. This type of litigation is presently ongoing in Utah following the 
legislature’s revision of the law based on the Conatser holding. See supra note 
 As Dan-
iel Farber and Carol Rose have observed, property litigants are 
often “discrete and insular minorities” with surprising, and of-
ten superior, power compared to the diffuse majorities who in 
many cases are the beneficiaries and would-be defenders of 
179.  
 181. See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 114, at 247 (discussing the politics of 
beachfront property law and policy development).  
 182. See Tarlock, supra note 143, at 773–74. 
 183. As Stewart Sterk notes in his discussion of legislative takings and 
state political process, “developers and local governments are both active in 
local politics . . . . Takings questions are a far cry from free speech or equal 
protection controversies that typically pit a disenfranchised individual with an 
unpopular cause against the power of the state.” Sterk, supra note 29, at 235; 
see also FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 4 (persuasively arguing that state legislative 
process provides substantial protection against legislative takings). 
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state enactments.184 State statutes imposing limits on regulato-
ry takings, requiring impact assessments, and restricting de-
velopment moratoria attest to the influence of landowners and 
developers in state politics.185 In addition, robust (though not 
unqualified) public disapproval of private property redistribu-
tion, as well as the growing number of private property protec-
tion groups, increases the responsiveness of state legisla-
tures.186
Notably, some cases that might at first appear as failed 
legislative checks, such as State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay
 Apart from public choice pressures, legislators may 
also act upon their personal commitments to property protec-
tion.  
187 or 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc.,188 on closer view do 
not appear to have escaped legislative revision due to political 
capture or legislative indolence. Rather, these court decisions 
and the legislature’s acceptance of them reflect common intui-
tions across state institutions about issues such as preserving 
long-standing public access rights or preventing de facto racial 
segregation on beaches.189 In other cases, reciprocal gains, or 
“givings,” to owners deprived of their rights by courts mitigate 
harm and eliminate the need for a legislative response.190 Liti-
gants alleging a “judicial taking” may not merit compensation 
under a regulatory-takings style analysis of social benefits 
compared to the net loss (i.e., after subtracting gains to owners) 
imposed on an owner by a state court.191 The plaintiffs in Stop 
the Beach, for example, did not have to pay for extremely ex-
pensive beach restoration and maintenance provided by the 
state.192
 
 184. See Farber, supra note 
 
29, at 289; Rose, supra note 111, at 1136. 
 185. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 257–60.  
 186. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 83, at 96; Nadler et al., supra note 83, at 
286–89; NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., supra note 83, at Q15. 
 187. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); see supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Thornton case). 
 188. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); see supra note 57 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Bay Head case). 
 189. See supra Part I.A. 
 190. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 
555 (2001) (conceptualizing government acts that enhance value within tak-
ings theory). 
 191. See Fennell, supra note 14, at 109–14.  
 192. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600, 2010–13 (2010).  
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While legislative gaps may be more confined than a pure 
public choice model would predict, on occasion a court may de-
prive a litigant of property, and the litigant may not receive re-
lief because a legislative check does not occur (or because statu-
tory relief does not apply retrospectively).193 The fact that on 
occasion an individual property owner may not receive recom-
pense from a change in the common law is less calamitous if 
one takes a social rather than individual perspective on proper-
ty rights and judicial takings. Regulatory takings doctrine, for 
example, privileges social interests over absolutist protection 
by weighing public interests in its balancing test and focusing 
takings liability on acts that “single out” owners for very large 
diminutions in property value.194 This perspective focuses on 
the legal superstructure of property rights, and the protection 
of property and other values, by balancing social and individual 
interests—not on the invariable protection or compensation of 
owners for every state incursion.195
 A particular point of vulnerability in a legislative process 
model is that legislatures are less likely to revise state court 
decisions that validate or prevent takings liability for state en-
actments. At first glance this appears to be a looming hole in 
the legislative process theory, but upon closer examination the 
problem is more confined. First, there are multiple circum-
stances in which legislatures may check their own statutory 
 From this vantage, the fact 
that from time to time an owner may not receive compensation 
or other relief following a judicial decision “taking” property 
rights may be the toll for avoiding the larger costs to property 
common law and social goals from a robust judicial takings doc-
trine.  
 
 193. For example, a recent case of an owner losing beachfront property 
rights dates to the period after the court decision allowing public access by ad-
verse possession in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz but before the legislative revi-
sion. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Implied Acceptance, by Public Use, of 
Dedication of Beach or Shoreline Adjoining Public Waters, 24 A.L.R. 4th 294 
(1983); Prescriptive Rights: Recreational Trail Users Win Right to Access Dirt 
Road, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. (Apr. 1, 2000, 1:00 AM), http://www.cp-dr.com/ 
node/1305. 
 194. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–41 (2005); see 
also Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 157–66 (considering how judicial takings fits 
within the Lingle regulatory takings framework). As the Supreme Court has 
made clear, absolute redress for any property infringement, no matter how 
small, is the exclusive doctrinal domain of physical takings by the legislature. 
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–
27 (1982). 
 195. I thank Robert Post for his comments on this point. 
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schemes or regulations, such as when the political winds have 
shifted the legislature’s initial support of an act, the legislature 
is divided, the statute is dated and the legislature feels no par-
ticular affinity toward it, or interest group pressure has become 
overwhelming. For alleged judicial takings in cases addressing 
state agency regulations, the legislature may be quite willing to 
check its own enactments if it disagrees with an agency action. 
Second, as discussed in Part I, even if the legislature supports 
the enactment and is unlikely to check a judicial decision sup-
porting it, there is little reason to presume, as some scholars 
have suggested, that courts are in danger of coordinating with 
the legislature to wrongfully uphold enactments.196 Last, it is 
noteworthy that often the cases that seem to be the best candi-
dates for the appellation judicial takings focus on common law 
questions rather than state enactments, or interpret statutes in 
a way that expands the law in a direction that either is disfa-
vored by the legislature or off the legislative radar screen.197
On the benefit side, one advantage of the variability of leg-
islative revision is the potential for legislative filtering of 
claims. State legislatures can efficiently filter out, or not re-
spond to, alleged judicial takings originating from court deci-
sions that increase rather than diminish property values (the 
“givings problem”), eliminate negligible rights, or convey strong 
social benefits.
 
The true Achilles heel of legislative checks is likely not in-state 
public choice failure, but the inadequacy of state political pro-
cess to protect out-of-state property interests (a point I take up 
in Part IV). 
198 In comparison, the judicial takings doctrine 
articulated by the Stop the Beach plurality does not distinguish 
between major versus minor rights appropriations, and offers 
no standard for distinguishing between the elimination versus 
clarification of common law rights.199
 
 196. Cf. Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 
 Concededly, exclusive Su-
preme Court jurisdiction of judicial takings claims would also 
serve as a filter. However, the Court’s history of property case 
16, at 328–29. 
 197. See supra Part I.A. But see County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 
57, 57–58 (1973) (affirming the eminent domain acquisition of ocean front 
property under a Hawaii state statute). 
 198. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 190. 
 199. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–10 (2010). Even if a reformulated judicial takings doc-
trine were to address these problems, it would reduce but not eliminate the 
costs to common law development and judicial resources. 
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selection, and its decisions in those cases, do not consistently 
track metrics such as economic value, political will, efficiency, 
or the magnitude of violations of individual rights (e.g., federal 
regulatory takings doctrine makes it nearly impossible for af-
fected owners to state claims that merit Supreme Court review 
and to prevail, while the Court’s physical takings doctrine does 
not distinguish between minute versus major government tak-
ings). In addition, for third-party claims by individuals who are 
affected by a judicial taking but were not parties to the under-
lying state court litigation, the Stop the Beach plurality opinion 
leaves open the prospect of lower federal court review (if the fi-
nal decision rule from Williamson County200 does not apply).201
Turning to the case law, the Hawaii case Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi, famous as an example of a judicial taking, also exem-
plifies how legislative revision may partially restore property 
rights despite strong popular support for the state supreme 
court’s redistribution.
 
202
The dispute in Robinson v. Ariyoshi began in 1959 as an 
unremarkable squabble between sugar companies as to their 
respective water rights in the Hanapepe River.
 This case suggests that the public 
choice dynamics surrounding state legislative checks are more 
complicated and difficult to predict than assumed. Legislative 
revision can occur in the face of strong political support for the 
court decision, although in such cases legislative action may be 
slower and restore rights only partially.  
203
 
 200. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 187 (1985) (“[A] claim that the application of gov-
ernment regulations effects a taking of property is not ripe until the govern-
ment entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final 
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”). 
 In McBryde 
Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, the Hawaii Supreme Court af-
firmed the sugar companies’ appurtenant water rights to take 
the non-surplus water flow, but sua sponte held that all surplus 
water in the state, including the normal, storm, and freshet 
 201. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609–10; see also Bloom & Serkin, 
supra note 17, at 604–08 (discussing forum considerations for third-party 
claimants). 
 202. 658 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1982) (reviewing alleged judicial taking in 
McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1973)); see also in-
fra notes 217–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ariyoshi plain-
tiffs’ rights were partially restored through grandfathering provisions imple-
mented in Hawaii’s Water Code in 1987). 
 203. See Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d at 292–93 (describing procedural history). 
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surpluses, was the property of the state.204 The Hawaii Su-
preme Court also held that landowners adjacent to the streams 
could not transfer their water to other parcels outside the wa-
tershed, reversing the sugar plantation owners’ longstanding 
private right to transport water via irrigation systems to other 
areas.205 The decision abruptly reversed nearly a hundred years 
of legal treatment of surplus water rights as private property. 
This history of water rights was a source of much bitterness 
and conflict in the state.206 Water privatization had followed the 
overthrow of the Hawaii kingdom, the conquest of land and wa-
ter rights, and the reversal of customary Hawaiian law of 
communal ownership of water.207
After an unsuccessful rehearing before the Hawaii Su-
preme Court, the sugar companies challenged the decision in 
federal district court.
  
208 In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the federal dis-
trict court heard the sugar companies’ claims that the Hawaii 
Supreme Court had violated substantive due process (the judi-
cial taking claim) and procedural due process and enjoined 
state officials from enforcing McBryde.209 Subsequently, the 
Ninth Circuit certified questions back to the Hawaii Supreme 
Court about the meaning of state ownership of surplus waters 
in McBryde.210
 
 204. 504 P.2d at 1339–41. 
 The Hawaii Supreme Court then sidestepped the 
judicial taking issue by holding that state ownership of the wa-
ter did not refer to corporeal ownership (which would be a tak-
 205. Id. at 1339. 
 206. Since 1894, following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, private 
water rights replaced the prior Hawaiian custom of communal ownership of 
water. While the surplus rights were well-established in the sense of being 
relatively longstanding, the legal validity of this regime, and the legitimacy of 
the business interest-dominated courts of that period, was controversial (espe-
cially because the private rights pre-dated Hawaiian statehood). See Ariyoshi, 
658 P.2d at 306–08. For a fascinating discussion of the history of Hawaiian 
water rights, and the perspective of the Hawaii Supreme Court written by the 
former counsel to the Hawaiian Chief Justice Richards at the time of the Rob-
inson cases, see Williamson B.C. Chang, Judicial Takings: Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi Revisited, 21 WIDENER L.J. 655, 682–706 (2012) (concluding that the 
McBryde holding was a “corrective decision [that] restored communal water 
practices in place of private ownership of water,” and that the case would not 
have been a judicial taking under the plurality’s test in Stop the Beach be-
cause private rights to surplus water were not sufficiently established in Ha-
waiian law).  
 207. See Chang, supra note 206, at 697–704. 
 208. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977). 
 209. See id. at 564. 
 210. See Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d at 292–94. 
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ing) but rather reaffirmed the State’s common law public trust 
rights over state waters.211 Functionally, the result was the 
same for the owners whose former private water rights were 
now public trust rights vested in the state. However, the fact 
that the state had not taken ownership but rather asserted 
longstanding background public trust rights meant that the 
matter was not constitutionally ripe as a taking. Additional 
court proceedings followed, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
order to the federal courts to reconsider the case in light of Wil-
liamson County,212 and the federal district court’s subsequent 
finding that the case was ripe for decision and possible relief.213 
Finally, in 1989, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack 
of ripeness.214
As it turns out, the only relief that the former owners re-
ceived was from the state legislature. Despite tremendous ma-
joritarian support in Hawaii for the redistribution of private 
rights from the sugar companies to the state, the legislature 
acted to partially restore the private water rights.
 After decades, the litigation petered out without 
resolution of the judicial taking claim. 
215 Following 
the litigation, the legislature and executive branches did not 
enforce the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision and the sugar 
companies continued to use the surplus water.216
 
 211. See id. at 310. 
 The Hawaii 
Supreme Court decision establishing public trust rights wiped 
the legal slate sufficiently clean for the legislature over several 
 212. See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902, 902 (1986). The 1985 Supreme 
Court decision in Williamson County held that a takings claim is not ripe until 
the government entity charged with the taking has reached a final decision as 
to how it will apply the regulation to the land in question. See Williamson 
Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 
191 (1985). 
 213. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1020–21, 1023–24 (D. Haw. 
1987). 
 214. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To date, 
the State has not interfered in any way with the parties’ use or diversions of 
the waters of the Hanapepe and its tributaries. . . . [E]ven if the State of Ha-
waii has placed a cloud on the title of the various private owners, this inchoate 
and speculative cloud is insufficient to make this controversy ripe for re-
view.”).  
 215. See infra notes 217–21 and accompanying text. The strong popular 
support for redistribution derived from the oligopoly of the sugar companies 
and bitter conflicts as to the validity of the plantation owners’ rights in light of 
Hawaii’s troubled history of native land dispossession. See generally Chang, 
supra note 206, at 697–704. 
 216. See Interview with Williamson B.C. Chang, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
Haw. at Mānoa William S. Richardson Sch. of Law (July 25, 2012). 
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years to complete a comprehensive state water code and to re-
store some of the sugar companies’ water rights. As this case 
illustrates, legislative revision need not be exclusively motivat-
ed by a state court decision in order to address a judicial tak-
ing. The owners’ rights in Robinson v. Ariyoshi were one item 
in a larger legislative agenda motivating the enactment of the 
Water Code.  
The amended Water Code created a permit system that 
grandfathered in existing users, including the plantation own-
ers in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.217 The permits were transferable, in 
whole or part, and remained indefinitely in effect without re-
newal obligations.218 The Water Code also restored the right to 
transfer water outside the watershed from which it was tak-
en.219 The practical impact was that the former private owners, 
such as the sugar companies, received about half of the water 
they had previously had rights to under the pre-McBryde water 
rights regime.220 In essence, the Water Code effected a compro-
mise. Users who had lost their vested common law rights in 
McBryde gained much-needed clarity and certainty about their 
property rights as well as durable, generous permits that al-
lowed them to continue a large share of their prior water ap-
propriation.221
 
 217. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-50 (West 2008). 
 The state gained greater control over water us-
age and the legal authority to manage water through the 
permit system in order to prevent resource degradation and 
harm to downstream users. In this case, coalition politics and 
logrolling yielded a viable intermediate solution to judicial ac-
tivism and to the state’s distribution of public and private wa-
ter rights. 
 218. See id. § 174C-55 (providing that each permit is valid until the desig-
nation of the water management area is rescinded); id. § 174C-59 (providing 
that transfers are allowed with the same permit conditions). The Water Code 
limited permit revocation to cases where the commission rescinded the water 
management area designation, the permit holder engaged in partial or total 
non-use of the water, or the permit holder otherwise violated the application 
or permit requirements. See id. § 174C-58(1)–(4) (providing rules for the revo-
cation of permits). 
 219. See id. § 174C-49(a) (conditions for a permit). 
 220. See Interview with Williamson B.C. Chang, supra note 216. 
 221. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (discussing the 
McBryde case).  
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III.  POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE   
The public debate and legal scholarship have focused on 
how judicial takings will chill state courts’ development of 
property common law.222 Yet, the harms to property law also 
derive from the potential of judicial takings to alter or mute 
legislative checks and the legislative role in developing state 
property law. Depending on the degree of financial liability and 
political pressure confronting the state legislature, judicial tak-
ings may alter the likelihood of legislative revision, chill inter-
mediate legislative solutions, crowd out legislators’ constitu-
tional property commitments, or create duplicative and 
overlapping federal court and state legislative revision process-
es. In theory, the same problems afflict federal court review of 
due process claims of state court wrongdoing. However, under 
the Stop the Beach plurality’s expansive definition and likely 
remedy of compensation, a federal judicial takings doctrine is 
likely to create many more claims, and correspondingly more 
state legislative distortions, than federal due process.223
A. THE LIKELIHOOD OF INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE 
REVISION 
  
The Stop the Beach plurality proposed that if the Supreme 
Court finds a state court has eliminated an established com-
mon law property right, it would invalidate the decision as ap-
plied to the litigants (typically this would functionally invali-
date the statutory provision or relevant doctrine altogether). 
The state legislature would then have the choice to either pay 
compensation or acquiesce in the invalidation of the state court 
decision.224 The Stop the Beach plurality opinion did not clarify 
whether First English225
 
 222. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 
 creates interim judicial takings liabil-
4, at 107–08. 
 223. This is particularly true because the judicial takings standard in Stop 
the Beach is expansive and may not include countervailing considerations, 
such as the public value of the government’s action and reciprocity of ad-
vantage to the private owner. See generally Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 158–68 
(comparing judicial takings doctrine with the Lingle regulatory takings 
framework). 
 224. For a pure common law case, not involving a statute or regulation, it 
is not clear whether the Stop the Beach plurality contemplates federal court 
invalidation, a matter of some constitutional tension, or the arguably even 
stranger situation of the case returning to the state court with the legislature 
now involved in the judicial (or legislative?) compensation decision.  
 225. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
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ity for the period from the judicial decision until its invalida-
tion—another devil in the details of judicial takings doctrine. 
The likelihood that state legislatures will act spontaneous-
ly (i.e., not under federal court order) to revise judicial activism 
depends on whether First English applies and creates state lia-
bility for interim takings damages. It also depends on the de-
gree of political pressure or exigent need for legislative action 
to correct a court decision as well as the likelihood of federal 
review (i.e., whether the Supreme Court, with its limited dock-
et, has exclusive jurisdiction over judicial takings claims or 
whether litigants or third parties can raise their claims before 
lower federal courts). When there are easy political gains from 
legislative revision or practical necessity to act, legislatures are 
likely to respond regardless of judicial takings doctrine—
indeed, in some cases, legislators may gain political capital by 
acting immediately to right the judicial wrong. However, in 
these cases, as I will discuss in Part III.D, legislative action 
and a judicial taking appeal may overlap and lead to duplica-
tive action and wasted resources.  
If First English does not apply and the political pressure on 
the legislature is not overwhelming, state legislatures may be 
less likely to be first movers that initiate checks of state court 
activism independent of a federal court order to do so. In these 
circumstances, judicial takings doctrine provides “political cov-
er” that allows legislatures to more easily evade or forestall 
public demands for action. A politically risk-averse or inert leg-
islature now has the ready excuse that a federal court will be 
addressing the problem or that these claims are rightfully a 
matter for judicial review. Thus, in certain circumstances, judi-
cial takings may reduce the involvement of institutions that are 
democratically accountable to the state’s citizens and expert in 
the state’s property law—state legislatures. Of course, the Stop 
the Beach plurality approach draws state legislatures into the 
process by returning the Supreme Court’s or lower federal 
court’s judgment of a judicial taking to the legislature to acqui-
esce in the invalidation or pay compensation. However, this 
form of federally-coerced state legislative involvement (which 
will typically result in invalidation) will tend to be formulaic 
and hollow, both substantively and in its expressive value to 
the state’s citizens.  
 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
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If First English does apply and creates state liability for 
temporary takings damages, the incentives for state legislative 
action are very different. In this scenario, state legislatures 
have incentives to act quickly to revise state court judgments 
that threaten substantial takings liability and loss of state rev-
enue (more strongly so if there is lower federal court review as 
opposed to exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction). Indeed, if 
First English applies, it is quite possible that risk-averse state 
legislatures will overreact and revise too many state court opin-
ions, or revise them too severely, thereby chilling the develop-
ment of the common law.226
Both with and without First English liability, there are ex-
pressive and symbolic losses to state citizens from judicial tak-
ings doctrine. As discussed previously, state legislatures that 
act as independent first movers to address judicial property ac-
tivism express, or signal, the legislature’s position on property 
rights stability and their intentions to avoid radical redistribu-
tions.
 First English interim judicial tak-
ings liability may also distort legislative responses by 
encouraging legislative revision when there appears to be a low 
probability that the state court action was a judicial taking but 
huge financial liability under First English if a federal court 
later disagrees. The costliness of legislative process mitigates 
legislative overrevision of state court decisions to a degree (i.e., 
legislatures will compare the costs of revision to the expected 
value of temporary takings damages). However, state legisla-
tures can reduce their costs of revision through steps such as 
creating state positions or institutions to monitor courts and 
formulate revisions for legislative vote.  
227
 
 226. The costliness of legislative action mitigates against a high frequency 
of legislative revision in general. With temporary takings liability under First 
English, however, the legislature must weigh the costs of takings liability, 
both direct and political, against the costs of legislative revision. 
 Federal judicial takings liability mutes the expressive 
and symbolic value of state legislative checks. When legislative 
revision occurs, state citizens are less likely to view it as moti-
vated from legislative commitments to property stability or 
balancing property interests and state needs. Rather, citizens 
may perceive state legislatures acting as the federal court’s 
lackey or in a desperate rush to avoid temporary takings dam-
ages. One might respond that what matters both substantively 
and expressively to citizens is the fact of the reversal, or that 
citizens may not understand the federal role in the legislative 
 227. See supra Part II.B.4. 
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reversal. The latter is possible but not universal, especially in 
light of the extensive media coverage that accompanies contro-
versial court decisions on property rights. The former may (or 
may not) be true with respect to the particular “judicial taking,” 
but it will not generalize to other contexts in which state legis-
latures and state courts adjust and administer property rights. 
A federal judicial takings decision does little to address citizen 
confidence in state legislative judgment in the many situations 
where takings claims, legislative or judicial, would not apply or 
succeed.  
B. COSTS TO PROPERTY LAW DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL 
ACCOMMODATION  
In the face of a federal judicial taking determination, state 
legislatures are less likely to innovate, enact comprehensive 
legislation, or respond to state court activism with intermediate 
or compromise solutions. If the legislature wishes to craft its 
own legislation adjusting the adjudicated property rights, even 
in minor ways, following a federal court judgment of a judicial 
taking, it will reasonably fear that the judicial takings case has 
set the stage for subsequent Fifth Amendment takings liability 
against the legislature. Accordingly, state legislatures have di-
minished incentives to engage in lawmaking beyond a straight-
forward acquiescence in the federal invalidation of the state 
court decision. This will tend to chill the legislative develop-
ment of state property law, including middle ground solutions 
and attempts by the legislature to address resource conflicts by 
enacting comprehensive regulatory approaches. Of course, the 
desirability of intermediate solutions and political accommoda-
tion depends on the particular facts and circumstances—the 
middle ground is not intrinsically efficient or principled. In 
many cases, however, intermediate solutions in property and 
water law conflicts are efficient as well as more politically pal-
atable in the long-term than binary conflict resolution. As dis-
cussed previously, intermediate solutions may also be faithful 
to the common law by reflecting the underlying goals and in-
tentions of common law rules or the common law history of the 
issue taken as a whole.228
Following a judicial taking determination, legislatures 
have reduced incentives to engage in a full political process and 
allow state interests to be heard. They are likely to invalidate 
  
 
 228. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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and either decision, compensate or invalidate, must be accom-
plished quickly if temporary takings liability is accruing. This 
has costs to public acceptance and the legitimacy of state prop-
erty law. Political process increases the flow of information be-
tween interest groups and legislatures and, if sufficiently re-
spectful and fair, can be a surprisingly important factor in 
citizens’ satisfaction with outcomes.229 If legislative process does 
occur following a federal judicial taking determination, or the 
prospect of one, the niceties of “framing” the political process 
and the ensuing legislation to emphasize mutual benefits or 
public values may be lost—the legislature may feel the federal 
court order speaks for itself.230
The recent experience in Oregon is instructive. In 2005, 
Oregon enacted Measure 37, which required local governments 
to either compensate landowners for land use regulations that 
reduce property values or to repeal those regulations.
 These dynamics exist with and 
without First English liability, but are more intense when the 
legislature is acting quickly to minimize temporary takings 
damages.  
231 Nearly 
without exception, localities chose to repeal the regulations ra-
ther than pay compensation. Measure 37 chilled local govern-
ment lawmaking, including regulations and potential amend-
ments of contested ordinances, which would have provided net 
benefits. A number of local government measures that protect-
ed property and increased property values on net foundered be-
cause localities were averse or unable to pay compensation to 
the subset of negatively impacted property owners, including in 
some cases minimally harmed owners.232 These problems led 
the Oregon legislature to enact a subsequent law, Measure 49, 
which greatly limited the property protection and compensation 
provisions of Measure 37.233
 
 229. For an account of how procedural fairness in legal processes affects 
satisfaction with outcomes and perceptions of laws’ legitimacy, see E. ALLAN 
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 76–
83 (1988).  
 Admittedly, the analogy to judicial 
takings is imprecise because the decision to invalidate regula-
tions or pay compensation in Measure 37 was vested in local 
 230. If framing or political accommodation does occur it may appear less 
credible against the backdrop of a federal court decision and the legislature’s 
unwillingness or inability to pay compensation.  
 231. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.305 (West 2013). 
 232. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evi-
dence from the Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1329–30 (2009). 
 233. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 195.300–.336. 
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governments. However, there is little reason to believe that fol-
lowing a federal judicial taking determination state govern-
ments will be dramatically more likely to open their coffers to 
pay compensation or any less risk averse about crafting subse-
quent middle ground solutions or compromise legislation. In 
the judicial takings context, some may view such legislative 
chilling as unproblematic on the theory that invalidation and 
full restoration of the contested common law right is the only 
correct course of action. However, this view does not account for 
cases where the common law is opaque or anachronistic or for 
the possibility of a superior legislative resolution. 
C. CROWDING OUT STATE LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMITMENTS  
Situating judicial takings oversight in state legislatures 
may be one important aspect of developing legislators’ property 
constitutionalism. Judicial takings may crowd out to a degree 
state legislators’ role in property protection and willingness to 
redress state court activism, at least with respect to independ-
ent legislative checks (i.e., not under a federal court order).234 
Currently, state legislatures perceive themselves as the bodies 
responsible for redressing state court radicalism with respect to 
property rights, at least if no state court constitutional pro-
nouncement is at play, or the state constitution does not re-
strict constitutional review to courts.235 For example, the legis-
lative history of the Conatser case makes evident that one of 
the aims of the Utah legislature was to enforce state constitu-
tional protection of private property rights.236
 
 234. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. 
ECON. SURVS. 589, 589–97 (2001) (describing how external punishments and 
incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation). 
 The difficulty of 
prevailing on federal due process claims supports this legisla-
tive perception. 
 235. For example, the legislature following Conatser discussed that a state 
constitutional conclusion from the state supreme court acted as an absolute 
restraint on legislative action. The legislator who introduced a bill seeking to 
restore the private owners’ rights remarked in the house floor debate that the 
“good news is the court did not rely upon any constitutional provisions. There’s 
no constitutional analysis; it relied on a statute. The legislature can deal with 
statutes; it can clarify and amend.” See Audio recording: Floor Debate on 
House Bill 141: Recreational Use of Public Water on Private Property, 2010 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010) (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/ 
htmdoc/hbillhtm/HB0141.htm (statement of Rep. McIff). 
 236. See Williamson, supra note 138, at 327–28. 
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In his theory of judicial overhang, Mark Tushnet contends 
that the federal courts’ role reduces the incentives for Congress 
to consider constitutional concerns as part of the legislative 
function.237 Judicial overhang from a federal judicial takings 
doctrine may similarly lessen state legislators’ view of their ob-
ligations as constitutional property rights protectors and signal 
to legislatures that checks of state court property activism are 
not within their properly understood sphere. This is particular-
ly likely because judicial takings doctrine derives from the 
Fifth Amendment, which empowers government—apparently 
now including state courts—to take property.238
One may question whether it matters if legislators experi-
ence crowding out if judicial takings doctrine is available to ad-
dress state court “takings.” Notably, if the Supreme Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear judicial takings cases (a point not 
clarified in Stop the Beach with respect to whether third-party 
claims can originate in federal court),
 This reinforces 
to legislatures the notion that state court property abuses are 
now within the judicial sphere, seemingly as an affirmative 
state court right as well as a ground for federal court invalida-
tion. If the takings power is equally vested in state courts and 
state legislatures, then why should state legislatures check 
state courts?  
239
Of course, crowding out, like the other dynamics discussed 
in this Part, depends on political pressures and circumstances, 
the likelihood of federal forums in addition to Supreme Court 
review, and the details of judicial takings doctrine and the fed-
 the forum for judicial 
takings is limited. Destabilizing the legislative understanding 
of its constitutional obligations, even to a modest degree, may 
result in less redress for state court property activism. Also, 
this view looks too narrowly to state court activity that would 
fall within the auspices of a judicial takings doctrine. It ne-
glects the many other property rights issues, in the state courts 
and state legislatures, for which a general legislative commit-
ment to avoiding radical, uncompensated redistribution of 
property rights is important. 
 
 237. See TUSHNET, supra note 20, at 57–58. 
 238. For discussion of this point in Stop the Beach, see Stop the Beach Re-
nourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. 
Ct. 2592, 2616 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 239. See id. at 2609 (discussing respondents’ arguments over whether fed-
eral courts have the capacity to address these claims without deciding if they 
have that power). 
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eral order to the state legislature. For example, one objection to 
my account is that if, as the Stop the Beach plurality suggests, 
federal courts must return judicial takings judgments to the 
state legislatures to acquiesce in the judgment or pay compen-
sation, this may “crowd in” a property-protective role. I think 
this is unlikely and if it does so, it will be in the limited sense of 
the state legislature viewing its constitutional role as imple-
menting federal court judgments. In a similar vein, if First 
English applies, legislatures will perceive if not a constitution-
al, at least a practical, obligation to act. However, the dynamic 
has changed in important ways from the legislature initiating 
change on its own volition to it scurrying to avoid racking up 
monetary liability.  
D. PROCESS CONFLICTS AND MOOTNESS 
Of course, judicial takings doctrine does not chill legislative 
revision in every circumstance. In the face of overwhelming po-
litical pressures or steep social or economic losses, the legisla-
ture often has no choice but to act. In Krummenacher v. City of 
Minnetonka,240 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the dec-
ades-old “reasonable manner” rule, a common law interpreta-
tion of an underspecified statutory provision, and held that 
granting a variance required a showing that the property in 
question could not be put to any reasonable use.241 For a period 
of time, this holding effectively wiped out variances as a flexi-
bility device for zoning across the state (though Minnetonka 
evaded the ruling by granting a retroactive expansion permit 
rather than a variance for a non-conforming building project).242
 
 240. 783 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 2010). 
 
Responding to enormous political pressure from a broad-based 
constituency of private and public interest groups, spearheaded 
 241. In this case, Beat Krummenacher sued the city after it granted his 
neighbor JoAnne Liebeler, former host of the PBS-TV remodeling show 
Hometime, a permit to remodel her roof in order to build a personal yoga stu-
dio and craft room. Id. at 724. Consistent with the bi-directional interaction 
between courts and legislatures, the Krummenacher court intimated that the 
legislature should reconsider the statute when it observed that the court’s 
hands were tied “unless and until the legislature takes action to provide a 
more flexible variance standard for municipalities.” Id. at 732. 
 242. See Katelynn Metz, Minnetonka Zoning Fight Has Statewide Impact, 
MINNETONKA PATCH, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.minnetonka.patch.com/ 
articles/zoning-fight-hits-home-in-minnetonka (interviewing owner of a con-
struction company who could not receive the necessary permits for his clients 
following the decision). 
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by the League of Minnesota Cities,243 the legislature swiftly en-
acted a revision that reinstituted the “reasonable manner” 
standard with minor modifications.244
In the face of intense political pressure or large economic 
losses from a state supreme court decision, state legislatures 
will act quickly. This creates a risk that the legislative process 
will operate concurrently with a judicial takings appeal, wast-
ing institutional resources on duplicative efforts. The legisla-
ture may be considering bills, for example, while the federal 
court is reviewing the constitutional claim. Of course, political 
exigency and the litigants’ awareness of brewing legislative ac-
tion may in some cases encourage litigants to hold off on feder-
al appeal. In other cases, for a number of reasons, including 
strategic litigation decisions, uncertainty about the content of 
any state legislative revision, or even to strengthen their posi-
tion in lobbying the legislature, litigants may file judicial tak-
ings appeals despite the likelihood of a legislative response. 
 It is not clear whether 
the Krummenacher case would qualify as a judicial taking or a 
mere restriction on land use (i.e., consonant with regulatory 
takings doctrine). However, the point of this case is not the tak-
ing per se. Rather, the case illustrates how exigent circum-
stances or fierce political pressure in response to a state su-
preme court property decision can provoke a rapid legislative 
response that may overlap and duplicate a federal judicial tak-
ing appeal. 
 
 243. See Katelynn Metz, Fight Between Minnetonka Neighbors Finds Fix at 
State Capitol, MINNETONKA PATCH, April 28, 2011, http://minnetonka.patch 
.com/articles/fight-between-minnetonka-neighors-finds-fix-at-state-capitol. 
The long list of interest groups in support of the revision included the League 
of Minnesota Cities, the Association of Minnesota Counties, the Association of 
Minnesota Building Officials, Metro Cities, the Minnesota Shopping Associa-
tion, the St. Paul Chamber of Commerce, and many other public associations. 
State builders, realtors, and agricultural interests supported revision of 
Krummenacher on the condition that the revised law not give local govern-
ment the authority to impose conditions on the grant of a variance. See Vari-
ance Bill Alert and Update, METRO CITIES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www 
.metrocitiesmn.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7BCB72E760-F9D0 
-4BE4-83C2-BC7C0D3B0B5A%7D (describing interest groups debating the 
proposed bills). 
 244. Applicants must show that they propose “to use the property in a rea-
sonable manner not permitted by the zoning ordinance.” The legislature 
changed the standard for granting a variance to “practical difficulties” and re-
tained the former prongs of the test requiring that unique circumstances of 
the property necessitate the variance and that the variance will not alter the 
essential character of the locality. MINN. STAT. § 462.357 subdiv. 6(2) (2011). 
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In addition to wasting resources in duplicative processes, 
temporal overlap between federal court review and state legis-
lative revision may also stymie the judicial appeal process with 
prudential concerns. If First English does not apply and a legis-
lative revision passes while the federal appeal is pending, it 
could moot the judicial takings claim, at least if invalidation is 
the remedy for judicial takings. If First English applies, the 
claim will not be mooted in its entirety, as the temporary dam-
ages remain. However, it is conceivable that state legislatures 
could attempt to dismantle First English takings liability, as 
they have done in some cases with legislative takings by locali-
ties, by enacting laws that make judicial takings void ab initio 
because the taker, here the state court, acted without authori-
ty.245 This would be vulnerable on federal and state grounds, 
but it is conceivable that such legislation would survive on the 
basis claimed by the Stop the Beach plurality: there is no feder-
al constitutional distinction between state courts and legisla-
tures.246
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE   
 
If judicial takings is a matter of constitutional necessity to 
protect property, as the Stop the Beach plurality claims, then 
why has it not developed in federal or state constitutional law? 
The framers did not envision judicial takings as a matter of 
original intent and there is no indication that it was part of the 
original understanding of the federal Takings Clause at the 
time of Constitution-making.247
 
 245. I thank Stewart Sterk for this insightful point. See E-mail from Stew-
art Sterk, Professor of Law, Cardozo Sch. of Law, to author (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:15 
EST) (on file with author). 
 In over two hundred years, the 
 246. See id. 
 247. Indeed, it appears that the framers contemplated only physical tak-
ings, not regulatory takings much less judicial ones. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *135 (eminent domain was a legislative, not judicial power). 
For an insightful historical account of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 
see generally William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Sig-
nificance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE 
L.J. 694, 700–17 (1985). Stacey Dogan and Ernest Young write that, “From a 
historical perspective, it strikes us as odd to suddenly define as a taking the 
kind of common-law evolution that was occurring before, during, and after the 
adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but was never thought to 
raise Takings Clause concerns.” Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 114. For a 
discussion of how original meaning differs from originalism, see Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601–05 
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Supreme Court has not adopted a judicial takings doctrine or 
even discussed in detail in a majority opinion the application of 
the Takings Clause to the judiciary. The closest the Court has 
come is dicta in Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes v. 
Washington, in which he noted that while the state court deci-
sion at issue conformed to reasonable expectations, if the facts 
were otherwise “a State cannot be permitted to defeat the con-
stitutional prohibition against taking property without due 
process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively 
that the property it has taken never existed at all.”248 Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckworth, another case cited by 
the Stop the Beach plurality, did not directly address a judicial 
decision but rather whether a county clerk lawfully refused to 
return nearly $100,000 in interest on purchase price money de-
posited into a bankruptcy receivership account because the 
statute, as interpreted by the court, deemed the interest “public 
money.”249 At the state level, no state or state court has adopted 
a judicial takings doctrine. This does not appear to stem from 
state laxity toward property protection. Many states have im-
posed substantive limits and procedural hurdles that constrain 
regulatory takings more stringently than the federal constitu-
tional floor of protection.250
This Article contends that the protective function of state 
legislatures and the advantages of state legislative checks offer 
a partial answer to why judicial takings doctrine has not devel-
oped to date. State institutions have evolved legislative checks, 
as well as common law doctrines and political restraints, as 
functional substitutes for judicial takings. The judicial takings 
debate has taken a myopic view, looking at institutional and 
doctrinal mechanisms in isolation and focusing narrowly on 
courts. Viewing only one moving piece biases toward the per-
 
 
(2004). 
 248. 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 249. 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The Supreme Court also attempted to situ-
ate judicial takings in constitutional history with Pruneyard Shopping Center 
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–84 (1980), however, by the Court’s own admission 
that “opinion addressed only the claimed taking by the constitutional provi-
sion” and “not the ‘judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private proper-
ty.’” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010). 
 250. See generally HARVEY M. JACOBS, STATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS: THE 
IMPACTS OF THOSE LAWS ON MY LAND (1999) (reviewing state laws that pro-
vide enhanced substantive or procedural protection against regulatory tak-
ings). 
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ception that unchecked state court property rights abuse is a 
problem of greater magnitude than it is in reality. Working in 
concert, state legislative revision, judicial norms, and popular 
pressures inhibit and address judicial takings; where these 
checks fail in some cases due process claims have successfully 
restored private rights. Due process, with its high threshold for 
a claimant to prevail and nebulous doctrinal parameters, 
makes success, particularly on substantive due process claims, 
difficult and uncertain.251 Although criticized by the Stop the 
Beach plurality on these bases, these qualities also roughly tai-
lor due process to the most extreme and exceptional cases of 
state court abuse and encourage other avenues of redress, in-
cluding state political process.252
The functionality of state legislative checks of courts is es-
pecially important in light of the high costs of a constitutional 
judicial takings doctrine. A growing collection of scholarship 
describes the potential costs of judicial takings doctrine to the 
development of the common law, judicial resources, federalism, 
environmental protection and climate change adaptation, and 
the internal consistency of Fifth Amendment takings jurispru-
dence.
  
253
 
 251. In addition, due process has benefited from several decades of Su-
preme Court review and federal-state accommodation that has lessened its ef-
fects on state autonomy. Indeed, the history of due process is instructive on 
the risk of creating new constitutional rights with no thought to the effects on 
the state legislative function. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 pas-
sim (1905). In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 382–85 (1937), and 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963), the Court held that the fun-
damental rights theory infringed on the authority of state legislatures. Subse-
quent cases have refined these holdings and charted a workable, if at times 
tense, balance between state autonomy and federal due process review.  
 Most damagingly, a constitutional doctrine that re-
 252. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D. 
Haw. 1978). 
 253. See Christie, supra note 16, at 73 (criticizing freezing common law de-
velopment via judicial takings doctrine at a time when the law requires flexi-
bility to respond to climate change and rising sea levels); cf. Craig Anthony 
Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property Law, Culture, 
and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 257–58 (2011) (sug-
gesting that judicial takings constraints should apply when judges eliminate 
property rights in static, unchanging or degraded land but not when the ecolo-
gy or geomorphology of coastal lands is changing or has changed); Dogan & 
Young, supra note 4, at 115–16 (discussing costs to common law development 
and federalism); Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 157–61 (identifying unresolved 
questions about the doctrinal impact and interaction of regulatory takings 
with the Lingle precedent and judicial takings); Mulvaney, supra note 4, at 
266 (discussing harms to common law evolution); Peñalver & Strahilevitz, su-
pra note 16, at 313 (addressing destabilized property doctrines).  
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stricts the elimination of a common law property right, no mat-
ter how out of sync that right may be with the current legal 
framework, limits the capacity of courts to respond to changed 
circumstances and arrests the development of the common 
law.254 This is problematic in many contexts, including the en-
vironmental issues raised in Stop the Beach where the state 
was responding to beach erosion likely caused or exacerbated 
by climate change.255
There are also burdens to judicial administration from ex-
panding the Fifth Amendment’s purview. The availability of a 
judicial takings claim enables owners with financial resources 
to strategically threaten litigation and appeal on judicial tak-
ings grounds against less cash-flush opponents.
 In addition to impeding common law evo-
lution, judicial takings doctrine may also distort legislative 
property law development, as discussed in Part III. 
256 Depending 
on its scope and standards, judicial takings doctrine may strain 
court dockets, as recognized by Justice Breyer who noted that 
“many thousands of cases involving state property law” could 
be subject to judicial takings claims under the Stop the Beach 
plurality’s approach.257 As my discussion of the Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi case illustrates, there is also potential for complicated 
procedural and prudential issues to protract litigation and judi-
cial takings appeals across many years.258
 
 254. See Dogan & Young, supra note 
 The magnitude of 
4, at 108 (discussing judicial takings 
as an impediment to common law evolution and a threat to the autonomy of 
state courts to interpret state law property doctrines); cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Wa-
ter Law’s Climate Disruption Adaptation Potential, N.W. L. SEARLE CENTER 7 
n.28 (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/ 
searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Tarlock_Water.pdf. 
 255. See Christie, supra note 16, at 73 (discussing the environmental con-
sequences of freezing common law development via judicial takings doctrine at 
a time when the law requires flexibility to respond to climate change and ris-
ing sea levels); cf. Arnold, supra note 253, at 257–58 (suggesting that judicial 
takings constraints should apply when judges eliminate property rights in 
static, unchanging or degraded land but not when the ecology or geomorpholo-
gy of coastal lands is changing or has changed). 
 256. Eduardo Peñalver & Lior Strahilevitz make the claim that judicial 
takings doctrine disincentivizes investment in litigation to clarify property law 
rights at trial by providing a constitutional avenue of appeal for a decision 
against the plaintiff. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 313.  
 257. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592, 2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring); cf. Barros, supra note 4, at 
959 (arguing that if “the scope of the Just Compensation Clause is properly 
limited to government actions that result in public-private transfers, this pru-
dential concern largely disappears”).  
 258. See supra Part II.C. 
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these costs depends on how expansively the Court defines the 
standard for judicial takings.  
Doctrinally, there are costs to specification of the issues left 
opaque in the Stop the Beach plurality opinion, such as the in-
teraction between judicial takings and the framework for regu-
latory takings delineated by the Court in Lingle v. Chevron and 
whether the public use requirement applies or judicial takings 
encompass private party cases.259 In particular, remedy and the 
scope of damages liability raise thorny issues. Because the text 
of the Takings Clause explicitly requires “just compensation” it 
is likely that if the Court adopts judicial takings it will be with 
a compensation remedy rather than invalidation.260 As the 
branch with spending power, presumably state legislatures 
would need to be involved in the compensation decision, either 
by approving compensation in individual cases or by providing 
a pre-determined compensation fund; otherwise, courts could 
order virtually unlimited compensation.261 This is a problematic 
form of a legislative check that may raise separation of powers 
issues, depending on individual state constitutional law, as well 
as claims that the legislature is violating the newfound takings 
power of the state courts. First English liability for temporary 
takings is another hurdle for judicial takings doctrine. If First 
English does not apply, it is likely to reinforce legislative iner-
tia in the face of judicial overreaching as well as sever judicial 
takings from regulatory takings jurisprudence.262 If it does ap-
ply, financial liability may spur state legislatures to check the 
courts too frequently or too severely, mute intermediate solu-
tions, and truncate aspects of the political process important to 
public acceptance and the perceived legitimacy of legal transi-
tions.263
 
 259. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). For a discus-
sion of the tension between regulatory takings and judicial takings and the 
potential impacts of Stop the Beach on future regulatory takings cases, see 
Kent, Jr., supra note 
  
16, at 157–61. Judicial takings may exacerbate the 
“muddle” of federal takings law as described by Carol Rose. See Carol M. Rose, 
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 561, 561–62 (1984).  
 260. See Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 261. If legislatures did not have the right to approve compensation in some 
form, then they might have incentives to subvert the state courts by engaging 
in strategic non-enforcement aimed at causing the takings claim to fail on 
mootness or ripeness grounds.  
 262. See supra Part III.A. 
 263. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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This Article argues that state legislative process, coupled 
with other institutional restraints, provides substantial protec-
tion against judicial property activism. In this Part, I examine 
how takings federalism grounds and strengthens the case for 
the status quo of state political process protection. I address ob-
jections to my account, such as why institutional and political 
checks justify treating state courts differently than legisla-
tures. I also offer some initial thoughts on whether the subset 
of cases involving out-of-state property interests necessitate 
constitutional judicial takings protection.  
A. THE TAKINGS FEDERALISM CONUNDRUM: WHY WE SHOULD 
TREAT STATE COURTS DIFFERENTLY 
Judicial takings create a dilemma: the Supreme Court 
must either embroil itself in state property law and local land 
use conflicts or devolve the development and oversight of judi-
cial takings to the allegedly offending state courts. In the regu-
latory takings context, the closest analog to judicial takings, 
federal courts have found they are ill-equipped to address state 
property law issues and have de facto delegated primary re-
sponsibility for regulatory takings law development and admin-
istration to the state courts.264
The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
makes clear that states, and state courts, define property. Reg-
ulatory takings doctrine relies on “background principles” of 
state law nuisance to determine takings claims.
 This history of takings federal-
ism puts into starker relief the problems with judicial takings 
doctrine—and the rationales for relying on existing political 
and institutional constraints on state courts.  
265 Property law 
varies significantly across the states based on differences in 
politics, natural resources, culture, fiscal conditions, and state-
specific historical understandings of public versus private 
rights.266 Not only does state law create the baseline of property 
rights, it is also necessary to determine the degree of change 
from the baseline that is acceptable (this is represented in reg-
ulatory takings with the standard of “distinct investment-
backed expectations”).267
 
 264. See Sterk, supra note 
 As Stewart Sterk explains, “[t]he Tak-
29, at 205–08. 
 265. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 266. Cf. Sterk, supra note 29, at 223 (discussing differences in states’ defi-
nitions of property rights). 
 267. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
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ings Clause protects primarily against change in background 
state law.”268 Changes in property law may be takings in one 
state with a high and stable baseline of property protection but 
not in another state whose courts and legislature have histori-
cally protected public interests at the expense of development 
or ownership rights.269
Sterk’s account of regulatory takings describes how the 
Supreme Court defers to state courts, most potently by making 
the test for a regulatory taking so weak that state courts have 
de facto control over doctrine and case resolution.
  
270 State 
courts and legislatures must provide specification and stronger 
standards, if desired.271 In addition, precedents such as San 
Remo and Williamson County impose exhaustion and other re-
quirements that channel takings cases to state courts and force 
state courts to develop and administer takings law, either as a 
state constitutional matter or, as is often the case, under co-
terminous state and federal takings doctrines.272 The Supreme 
Court has a strong incentive to delegate to the states, as Sterk 
observes, because regulatory takings decisions which depend on 
state law afford limited opportunities to provide national uni-
formity or guidance (important institutional goals of Supreme 
Court review).273 In contrast, in its physical takings jurispru-
dence the Supreme Court has been able to articulate a national 
standard, a permanent physical occupation of land, that applies 
across the states. Accordingly, the Court has been more active 
in the area of physical takings.274
 
(1978). 
  
 268. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 206. 
 269. See id. at 222; see also Bloom & Serkin, supra note 17, at 573–74.  
 270. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 230–31. 
 271. See id. at 231–32. 
 272. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 327 (2005); 
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 186–97 (1985); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings 
Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 253–55 (2006) (ripeness requirements 
for federal review of takings cases is an “essential pillar” of the Court’s 
longstanding though unarticulated delegation of takings conflicts to the state 
courts).  
 273. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 228. Sterk notes that in discrete areas of 
regulatory takings where the Court can create nationally uniform rules it has 
done so, including the Lucas rule requiring compensation for regulations that 
deprive an owner of 100% of her property value and the Nolan-Dolan rule re-
quiring a causal nexus between a development’s impact and a municipal exac-
tion. See id. at 207. 
 274. See id. at 232. 
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In the judicial takings context, federal courts will need to 
review state court determinations about the scope and content 
of state-created property rights and untangle complicated his-
tories of public and private rights. Like regulatory takings, 
many judicial takings claims will address state court decisions 
on local land use regulation, involving local circumstances and 
municipal law and procedure. If judicial takings doctrine tracks 
regulatory takings even loosely, federal courts will need to de-
termine the substantive state law to resolve whether the state 
court “took” a common law property right and whether the de-
gree of change violates the Takings Clause. The regulatory tak-
ings standard for investment-backed expectations is likely to 
apply in some form and require federal courts to determine the 
permissible degree of property change from the prior baseline 
of the state’s law and history of private property protection. 
Some scholars have also observed a property rights “trap” for 
judicial takings: if state laws define property, as the Supreme 
Court has long recognized, how can state courts as the authori-
tative interpreters of state law “err” so as to give rise to a judi-
cial taking?275
Because judicial takings entail state law determinations of 
property rights, the Supreme Court will find itself mired in the 
very review of state property law that it has spent decades at-
tempting to extricate itself from in its regulatory takings juris-
prudence. True substantive protection against judicial takings 
(i.e., at least a moderately robust standard) will require several 
layers of Supreme Court effort. The Court must develop stand-
ards and resolve the doctrinal holes described previously, such 
as remedy and temporary takings liability. Then, the Court will 
need to create iterations and applications of judicial takings to 
individual state cases, each with its own state property law, 
background common law of nuisance, and reasonable expecta-
tions of property protection. This will require the Supreme 
Court to labor well outside its institutional expertise.
  
276
 
 275. Frederic Bloom and Christopher Serkin explain this view: “Judicial 
takings thus cannot be seen as a means of error correction, since authoritative 
state courts cannot be wrong about the content of their own law.” Bloom & 
Serkin, supra note 
 Fur-
ther, these opinions will not provide national (or even circuit-
17, at 572 (arguing that judicial takings is a tool of legal 
transition relief, not error correction). 
 276. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 115–17. 
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wide, in the case of appellate federal court review) uniformity 
or guidance.277
Alternatively, as with regulatory takings, the Supreme 
Court can (and is likely to) delegate de facto much of judicial 
takings doctrine development to the state courts through nar-
row federal protection and a high threshold for claimant suc-
cess. If the Supreme Court follows this path, the federal stand-
ard for a judicial taking will likely be at a level of generality 
that offers limited guidance, substantive clarity, or conceptual 
traction (vagueness and generality enable a standard to apply 
across disparate state property law frameworks). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court, faced with the challenges of articulating a na-
tional constitutional standard for judicial takings amid the di-
versity of state property law, might develop the judicial takings 
doctrine so that it has virtually no impact—an outcome that 
raises the question of why we should adopt judicial takings at 
all.
  
278
To be clear, the problem is not that state courts are global-
ly unwilling to limit themselves—they already do so through 
state due process and the other common law doctrines dis-
cussed in Part I.
 Delimiting judicial takings doctrine with a toothless fed-
eral standard or obstacles to the federal forum under the belief 
that state courts will develop and enforce substantive judicial 
takings law to restrain their own decisions threatens a consti-
tutionally empty doctrine.  
279
In summary, there does not seem to be a viable way for the 
Supreme Court to develop judicial takings doctrine except to 
follow the path it has chosen for regulatory takings and to im-
plicitly delegate much of judicial takings development and in-
 What is unlikely is that state supreme 
courts will perceive the need to disrupt their present system of 
restraints to interpret cases so as to create a vigorous judicial 
takings doctrine absent a strong federal floor of protection (par-
ticularly since the doctrine state supreme courts develop will 
apply against them as well as lower state courts). It is also 
questionable whether state legislatures have an incentive to 
wade into the political and doctrinal quagmire to develop statu-
tory judicial takings prohibitions, especially given their capaci-
ty for legislative override and judicial jurisdiction-stripping.  
 
 277. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 230–31. 
 278. Cf. Fennell, supra note 14, at 90 (describing a very narrow scope and 
impact of judicial takings). 
 279. See supra Part I.A. 
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terpretation to the state courts. Such delegation works for leg-
islative takings in part because of institutional separation: leg-
islative decisions are reviewed by the separate institution of 
the state court. For judicial takings, however, this creates a 
dubious situation of institutional self-policing with state courts 
de facto developing the federal constitutional doctrine meant to 
constrain them.280 These issues offer a rejoinder to the plurali-
ty’s assertion that the Fifth Amendment does not differentiate 
among state actors.281 The Fifth Amendment should be inter-
preted in view of its institutional and doctrinal ramifications. 
The infeasibility of the Supreme Court developing doctrine for 
state law-based judicial takings questions and state law-
defined property on the one hand and the problems of implicit 
delegation of judicial takings doctrine to the states and state 
court self-policing on the other, are reasons why the Fifth 
Amendment does, and should, discriminate among state ac-
tors.282
B. OUT-OF-STATE INTERESTS 
  
The strongest case for a federal judicial takings doctrine is 
to address interstate “spillovers” where a state court decision 
wrongfully contracts out-of-state, federal, or tribal property 
rights. William Fischel has discussed this problem of legal 
 
 280. The difficulties of judicial takings federalism address a seeming dis-
crepancy in my account: even though state legislatures are subject to “checks” 
from state courts in the form of judicial review and are of course politically re-
sponsive bodies, state legislatures are still subject to federal takings liability. 
For judicial takings review, the problems of state court self-policing and the 
interference with takings federalism suggest a strong reason for treating state 
courts differently than state legislatures for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
 281. Justice Scalia wrote, “There is no textual justification for saying that 
the existence or the scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property 
without just compensation varies according to the branch of government ef-
fecting the expropriation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).  
 282. In addition, the Takings Clause does not contain the term “state”—if, 
as a textual matter, the failure to specify a branch of government means that 
the Takings Clause applies to all branches, then should the omission of the 
term “state” extend the Takings Clause to private actors? For an intriguing 
theory of private takings, see Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 517, 560–71 (2009). Bell also observes that the Fifth Amendment never 
explicitly granted the takings power exclusively to the states, although the 
fact that at the time of its adoption the Fifth Amendment applied only to the 
national government indicates that it was an enumerated power. See id. at 
525. For a discussion of the limits of textualism, see generally Thomas B. Col-
by & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009). 
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spillovers in the context of regulatory takings and property 
rights protection.283 When such a case is in state court, there 
may be a stronger rationale for enhanced constitutional protec-
tion of out-of-state interests. In theory, there is a greater risk 
for judicial redistribution to favor in-state interests (notably in 
a recent case a state court justice lost a retention election fol-
lowing her opinion validating federal water rights).284
Given the lack of data and comprehensive examination of 
this issue in property rights cases, at this juncture I am reluc-
tant to recommend extending judicial takings narrowly to cases 
addressing out-of-state interests. Resolving this question re-
quires an in-depth inquiry, partially empirical, that is not pres-
ently available. It is not clear that judicial favoritism toward 
in-state interests occurs with enough frequency, or in the ab-
sence of adequate legal protection from other doctrines, to justi-
fy the costs of even a narrowly cabined judicial takings doc-
trine—or that a judicial takings doctrine is the best legal 
prophylactic. Diversity and federal question jurisdiction mean 
that such cases often, though not inevitably, are heard in fed-
eral court. Importantly, there are an array of other laws, 
norms, and rules, including conflict of laws doctrines, which 
protect against unfair treatment of out-of-state interests. For 
example, in water law cases (a common setting for significant 
shifts in common law property rights), interstate compacts, the 
common law of equitable apportionment, and the dormant 
commerce clause either constrain judges directly or supply 
norms against disadvantaging out-of-state interests.
 And of 
course there is no incentive, and indeed a strong disincentive, 
for the legislature to intervene and check the state court deci-
sion.  
285
 
 283. See FISCHEL, supra note 
 In sum, 
the legal system has developed doctrines and norms to address 
out-of-state property interests that counsel caution in innovat-
ing additional Fifth Amendment protection.  
2, at 326–27. 
 284. See In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), su-
perseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 (Idaho 
2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion); Echeverria, supra note 27, at 
238–54. 
 285. I thank Dan Tarlock for his helpful points on this topic and on the 
Conatser case as well.  
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  CONCLUSION   
In Stop the Beach, a Supreme Court plurality opinion 
launched judicial takings in political and scholarly debate and 
laid the groundwork for future elaboration of a judicial takings 
doctrine. This Article has explored a neglected institution in 
this debate—state legislatures. State political process protec-
tion calls into question the need to innovate a Fifth Amend-
ment judicial takings doctrine and offers a compelling defense 
of the status quo. Case studies reveal unique institutional 
strengths to legislative checks of courts and suggest that legis-
lative process provides substantial protection against judicial 
overreaching. Moreover, state legislative process accomplishes 
this without the costs to property law development and federal-
ism of a constitutional judicial takings doctrine.  
